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I. INTRODUCTION
Spain today is approaching the crossroads of its political future.
It is now facing internal and external challenges which will significantly
affect the future of the young democracy. As Spain advances toward NATO
membership and continues its vigorous pursuit of full entry into the
European Economic Community (EEC), numerous problems confront Spanish
decision-makers. This thesis explores some of these obstacles on the
road to Spanish integration into Europe.
The demanding task of integrating national security and foreign
relations into actual policies to preserve democracy and promote national
interests abroad has faced the Spanish government for the past six years.
The fall of 1981 was the season chosen by this nascent democracy to
move forward witn an ambitious program. The request to join NATO, the
ultimate solution to the age-old Gibraltar dispute, and the on-going
negotiations between Spain and the EEC are basic to the long-term Spanish
goal of integration into Europe.
Recent events in Spain have placed the fragile democracy in jeopardy.
Internal political events have clouded the concerted efforts of the
Spanish government for full integration into Europe. The next six months
will be a crucial period for democratic Spain. This thesis will examine
some of the issues which may affect the political future of Spain and





Occupying more Chan four-fifths of the Iberian Peninsula, Spain
is separated by the Pyrenees from France and the rest of Europe but
includes within its national territory the Balearic Islands in the
Mediterranean, the Canary Islands in the Atlantic, and the two small
North African enclaves, or "presidios," of Ceuta and Melilla. Continen-
tal Spain, a region of varied topography and climate, has been noted more
for beauty of landscape than for wealth of resources, but possesses
deposits of iron, coal, and other minerals as well as petroleum. The
Spanish are a mixture of the original Iberian population with later
invading peoples. The population includes several cultural groups:
Castilians, Galicians, Andalusians, Basques, and Catalans. Regional
feelings remain strong, particularly in the Basque and Catalan areas in
the north and east, and various local languages and dialects are used in
addition to the long dominant Castilian Spanish. The regional languages
of Spain were accorded legal recognition November 16, 1975. The popula-
tion is almost entirely Roman Catholic, although religious liberty is
formally guaranteed.
The Spanish economy has been transformed since World War II. Between
1960 and 1972, the gross national product increased almost fivefold,
although substantial inflation and balance of payments problems subse-
quently curtailed the rate of growth. The principal industrial products
are leather, shoes, clothing, automobiles, and rubber; but the shipbuilding,
11

petroleum, and chemical industries are also of major importance. Agri-
culture, the traditional mainstay of the Spanish economy, has not kept
pace with industrial advances, despite more intensive utilization of
modern techniques and materials. The most important agricultural products
continue to be olives and olive oil, cereals, fruits, vegetables, and
wines
.
B. THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Conquered in the eighth century by North African Moors, who estab-
lished a flourishing Islamic civilization in the south of the peninsula,
Christian Spain completed its self -liberation in 1492 and went on to
found a world empire which reached its apogee in the sixteenth century
and then gradually disintegrated. Monarchical rule under the House
of Bourbon continued into the twentieth century, surviving the dictator-
ship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923-1930 but giving place in 1931 to a
multiparty republic. A military uprising led by General Francisco
Franco Bahamonde, which began in 1936, precipitated a three-year civil
war in which the republican forces, which benefited from Soviet and
Communist assistance, were ultimately defeated with aid from Fascist
Italy and Nazi Germany. A Fascist regime was then established, Franco
ruling as leader (El Caudillo) and Chief of State, with the support of
the Armed Forces, the Church, and commercial, financial, and landed
interests
.
Having preserved its neutrality throughout World War II and suffered
a period of ostracism thereafter by the United Nations, Spain was
gradually readmitted to international society and formed particularly
close ties with the United States within the framework of a joint
12

defense agreement originally concluded in 1953. The country's political
structure was modified in 1947 with the adoption of a Law of Succession,
which declared Spain to be a monarchy (though without a monarch), and
again in 1967 by an Organic Law confirming Franco's position as Chief of
State, defining the structure of other government organs, and providing
for strictly limited public participation in elections to the legislature
(Cortes). Political and administrative controls in effect since the
civil war were considerably relaxed during the early 1960 's, but subse-
quent demands for change voiced by students, workers, Basque and Catalan
nationalists, and sections of the intelligentsia and clergy, resulted in
increasing instability, which culminated in December 1973 with the
assassination of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco by Basque separa-
tists. The new prime minister, Senor Carlos Arias Navarro, initially
signaled his intent to deal harshly with dissidents; however, the April
1974 coup in Portugal, coupled with General Franco's illness in July of
that year, generated problems for the regime that resulted in some
moderation of its repressive posture.
General Franco again became ill on October 17, 1975, and on October
30, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon y Borbon, who had previously been
designated as heir to the Spanish throne, assumed the powers of provi-
sional Chief of State and head of government. Franco died on November
20, and two days later, Juan Carlos was sworn in as King, in accordance
with the 1947 Law of Succession.
On July 1, 1976, Sehor Arias Navarro resigned as prime minister
following criticism of his somewhat cautious approach to promised reform
of the political system. His successor, Sehor Adolf o Suarez Gonzalez,
13

moved energetically to advance the reform program. On June 15, 1977,
balloting took place for a new, bicameral legislature (Cortes), with
Prime Minister Suarez Gonzalez' Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)
obtaining a substantial plurality. On August 22, a special lower-house
subcommittee began drafting a new constitution, which went into force
December 29, 1978 after overwhelming approval of the Cortes, a public
referendum, and ratification by King Juan Carlos.
The present 169-article Spanish constitution, the seventh since
1812, abrogates the fundamental principles and organic legislation under
which General Franco ruled as Chief of State (Jefe del Estado) until his
death in 1975. The document defines the Spanish state as a parliamentary
monarchy and guarantees a variety of basic rights, including those of
speech and press, association, and collective bargaining. Roman Cathol-
icism was disestablished as the state religion. Torture was outlawed,
the death penalty was abolished, and a more equitable distribution of
regional and personal incomes was advanced. The powers of the King
include naming the Prime Minister, after consulting with the parties in
the Cortes, serving as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and
calling referendum. The prime minister, who is empowered to dissolve the
Cortes and call an election (previously the King's prerogatives), is
assisted by a cabinet that is collectively responsible to the lower house
of the Cortes.
Under the new constitution, legislative authority is exercised by a
bicameral Cortes, consisting of a territorially elected Senate of 208
members and a Congress of Deputies of 300-400 members elected on the
basis of universal adult suffrage and proportional representation. Both
14

houses serve four-year terms, barring dissolution; each can initiate
legislation, although the upper house can only delay measures approved by
the lower.
C. RECENT EVENTS
This background information is presented in order to clarify some of
the reasons Spain has not achieved integration into the European Commun-
ity. Under the Fascist rule of Generalissimo Franco, Spain was prevented
by certain democratic nations (notably Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the
Netherlands) from becoming a member of NATO, the European Economic
Community, and other Western organizations. Therefore, the Spanish
constitution of December 1978 is of substantial importance to any discus-
sion of Spanish integration into the European Community.
Continued terrorism and an attempted "golpe de estado," or coup
d' etat , against the state, have challenged the young Spanish democracy
during the early 1980' s. Prime Minister Suarez resigned under continued
criticism, especially from the Army generals, and partially due to the
fact that "he felt he no longer had the confidence of his party or the
2
King." The new Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, who like his prede-
cessor, Sehor Suarez, is a member of the UCD, has rejected a call from
the Socialists (PSOE) to form a coalition government so as to maintain the
limited allegiance of the generals, who fear giving any power to the left.
H. P. Klepak, Spain: NATO or Neutrality
,
ORAE Extra-Mural Paper
No. 11, Ottawa, Canada, April 1980, p. 116. At the NATO Conference in Rome
in May 1970, the northern European nations soundly ruled out Spanish
admission, adhering to their traditional position that democracy in Spain
was required before admission.
2
"James M. Markham, "A Royal Defender of Democracy," The New York
Times Magazine
, Section 6, March 29, 1981, p. 35.
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The policies of Sehor Calvo Sotelo seem to favor curtailing autonomy to
3
certain regions and insisting on the dominance or Madrid in most matters.
The coup attempt in February 1981 intensified Spanish efforts
of integration into the European Community. Spain's Foreign Minister,
Jose Perez-Llorca y Rodrigo, was in Brussels in March 1981, urging the EC
4
Council of Ministers to accelerate Spain's entry into the Community.
Acceptance among the European democracies is vital to post-Franco Spain,
and even the appearance of progress in the entry negotiations could
contribute to Spanish stability. Sehor Perez-Llorca called on the
Community to show more generosity and more concern for Spain's future.
Negotiations between Spain and the EEC have not been accelerated due
to internal problems within the European Community. Reform of the Commun-
ity's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and budget arrangements were the
primary focus of the EEC during 1981. Spanish entry into the EEC has
been effectively shelved until these internal organizational problems are
resolved. Negotiations between Spain and the EEC are still continuing,
but most informed observers realize that the structural changes within
the EEC could delay Spanish entry for a considerable period of time.
Due in part to the slow pace of these negotiations , the Spanish
government reassessed priorities and has requested entrance into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The SEC delays regarding Spanish
accession were probably a primary factor in the August 1981 Spanish





4John Nielsen, "Spain's Fragile Democracy," EUROPE , The magazine of
the European Community, May-June , 1981, No. 225, p. 34.
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III. SPANISH INTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES
In an analysis of the question of Spanish integration into Europe,
it is important to assess the attitudes of the major domestic elements.
There are four major political parties in Spain: the Communists (PCE);
the Socialists (PSOE); one rightist party with several extremist offshoots
(CD); and a large centrist right party (UCD), which often resembles a
coalition more than a fully cohesive force. In addition, several small,
regionalist parties clamor for greater autonomy and attention. Other
extremely important internal domestic forces are the King, the military,
the people, the terrorists of the Basque separatist organization
(ETA), and regional groups.
A. THE POLITICAL PARTIES
In order of importance in the 1979 Parliamentary elections, the
political parties rank, as follows: UCD (Union del Centro Democratico)
,
PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espahol), PCE (Partido Communista
Espahol), and the CD (Coalicion Democratico — formerly known as the AP
or Alianza Popular). There is widespread consensus among these parties
that EEC membership is of the utmost value to Spain. Attitudes on NATO
and other foreign policy issues hold no such consensus.
The UCD is essentially Eurocentric in its outlook with the fundamen-
tal objective of its foreign policy being the rapid incorporation of
Spain into NATO and the EEC. The party continues to emphasize the
historic and geographic links of Spain with Latin America, the Arab
17

world, and Africa, but views maintenance of Spain's somewhat fragile
democracy as a much more pressing issue.
The PSOE is a clear supporter of the construction of Europe. It
believes that democratic Spain cannot be absent from the building of a
United Europe that will "transcend outdated nationalisms and provide a
framework for the development of socialism, independent of imperialism
and in cooperation with the Third World." The PSOE advocates entry
of Spain into the European Community but maintaining a policy of neutral-
ity, outside NATO. This party has called for Spanish defense links with
the Western Europeans while rejecting the NATO umbrella of the U.S.
Antonio Sanchez Gijon has pointed out the contradiction in this socialist
defense policy that aims at: (1) cooperation with European countries, and
(2) "the progressive creation of a real third military force among




Spain's Communist Party, backs entrance into the EEC as
part of its program of strengthening the world workers movement but
opposes entry into NATO. It is headed by one of the major figures of the
world communist movement, Santiago Carrillo, who is the author of a major
text on Eurocommunism. In his book, Eurocommunismo y Estado , Carrillo
insists on the right to national paths to communism and a high degree of
democracy consistent with the political systems of Western Europe. As is
PSOE: 27th Congress
,
"La Defensa," Ediciones Avance , Madrid,
Espana, 1977, p. 291.
f.
Sanchez-Gijon, Antonio, Espana en la OTAN , Madrid, Ediciones
Defensa, 1978, p. 168.
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obvious, his book, and his views are not popular with the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
The CD (formerly AP) advocates the necessity of reminding all
Spaniards that they are Europeans. Nothing that happens on the Continent
should be alien to Spain. The CD believes that improving the EEC and
Spanish integration into the EEC are essential to the existence of Spain.
"Access to the EEC will create serious problems but Spain cannot witness
the European unification process as a mere spectator." The CD also
delares itself totally favorable to Spanish entry to the Atlantic Alli-
ance for the following reasons:
1. NATO continues to be a necessity for guaranteeing the security
of its members.
2. It is unlikely that, in the case of a grave crisis in Europe,
Spain would not become involved.
3. NATO offers deterrent protection.
4. NATO serves to curb a process of Finlandization.
5. Many other Spanish interests would be served by Spain's entry into NATO
such as: scientific, economic, industrial, and tehnological needs.
6. Spanish foreign policy would have more weight.
7. The Armed Forces could be harmonized into NATO due to their
modernization process which is on-going.
8. Support of Spain on the part of the European countries could be
secured through NATO.








It is essential to note that the policies expressed by the CD are those
espoused by the UCD, only not as vocally. The PSOE and the PCE have
similar connecting fibers between their platforms regarding NATO. All
the political parties are united, though, on the benefits of Spanish
entry into the European Community.
Within the compass of the remaining parties, the Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV) declares itself in favor of NATO entry with certain condi-
tions. Convergencia i Unio of Cataluha is in favor of NATO as long as
there is no alternative; the Socialist Party of Andalusia is absolutely
opposed to NATO; and the Union of the Canarian People is totally opposed,
considering NATO to be an institution prepared to use its influence and
its defense resources to further the interests of big multinational
corporations, imperialism, and local oligarchies.
Table I indicates the results of a study done after the 1979
Parliamentary elections placing the parties and their leaders on a
left-right scale. (Sotelo was added by this author to place him within
the spectrum; but the figures indicated for Suarez do not correspond
to Sotelo. The survey was a voter poll in which the voters placed
9themselves on the left-right scale.)
B. KING JUAN CARLOS I
King Juan Carlos I is by far the most popular figure in Spain,
especially in the aftermath of the unsuccessful February 1981 coup attempt
There are no new "Caudillos" or Francos among the generals. The King
9Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani , Goldie Shabad, "Party Strategies
in the 1979 Spanish Parliamentary Election," in World Affairs , volume
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*The following groupings of left-right scores were used: "Left (1-2);
"Center-Left" (3-4); "Center" (5-6); "Center Right" (7-8); "Right"
(9-10).
is fervent in his desire to see Spain gain membership in the European
Community and has also expressed a positive attitude toward NATO
membership. Some Spaniards believe that the best way to keep the armed
forces out of politics would be to bring Spain into NATO. It would be a
giant step toward closer integration with the European democracies—and
21

it would give the Spanish military a more purely military mission. What-
ever the outcome on eventual NATO membership, for the present, King
Juan Carlos is struggling to guide Spain through a difficult time and he
is trying to work, out a new "modus vivendi" between the generals and the
politicians.
C. THE MILITARY AND THE ETA
One of the most volatile and dangerous aspects of the political
transformations taking place in Madrid is the Army's new role in the
troubled Basque country. The Basque separatist group, the Basque Homeland
and Freedom (ETA), has long sought to provoke military retaliation by
singling out army officers for terrorist attack. In the past, the
government refused to give the military any sort of police power but this
policy was changed in March 1981. Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo reversed the
policy by assigning the Army and Navy to coast and border patrol duty in
the Basque region. The danger seen by many is that if the ETA continues
its terrorist killing, the generals will have to demand more police
powers; and due to the delicate politico-military balance in Spain, this
could force a showdown between the generals and the government. The King
is aware of the powerful, emotion-charged atmosphere and from all
appearances seems to be treading lightly internally, while pursuing the
goals NATO and European integration externally.
D. THE PEOPLE
The Spanish public has for five years been bombarded with political
propaganda essentially aimed at politicizing it, after decades of





Franco's rule, during which the Spaniard was generally discouraged
from coo great an interest in politics, or any interest in opposition
politics at all. Issues such as whether or not to move towards democracy
(1976), the formation of a constituent assembly (1977), the new constitu-
tion (1978), and general and municipal elections (1979), have all empha-
sized domestic concerns. Both the people and the government have had a
very difficult time dealing with these issues and therefore little time
left over for external policy. As Klepak notes,
Almost everyone in Spain believes the main problems of the country
to be economic. High inflation rates and very unsettling unemploy-
ment figures present a somewhat bleak picture. Spain is not a rich
country; it lacks capital, infrastructure, and natural resources; and
it faces invulnerable markets for its export products. Spaniards are
above all concerned over these difficulties and have often placed an
exaggerated hope in the EEC panacea."
On the question of NATO, the Spanish public has a great variety of
often bizarre ideas, when seen through U.S. eyes. Some believe that
Alliance membership will cause the Soviet Union to target Spain in a
nuclear exchange. The cost of NATO seems high to the people of
Spain who have survived with neutrality. All in all, there was little
puolic interest in joining the Alliance until August 1981, and it has
been an arduous task to muster public support for joining the NATO
alliance. The vocal opposition of the PSOE and the PCE received more
publicity and local attention than the weak efforts of the UCD to educate
the Spanish public on the benefits of NATO membership. Internal political
rivalries limited the ability of the UCD to effectively reach the Spanish
population and therefore helped to make the PSOE/PCE opposition to NATO







IV. THE UNION DEL CENTRO DEMOCRATICO—-SPAIN' S GOVERNING PARTY
The Union del Centro Democratico (UCD) is a political party which
was organized by the Spanish government to lead Spain from an authori-
tarian regime to a democratic system. It does not possess the tradition
and history of the other Spanish political groups, but it has succeeded in
guiding the nascent democracy through six years of post-Franco transition.
Until February 1981, the UCD maintained the chairmanship of the party
and the premiership of the Spanish government in one person—Adolfo
Suarez. After Suarez resigned as President on January 29, 1981, the
chairmanship of the party and the premiership of the government were
split. Up to that time, this union entailed a subordination of the party
to the actions of the government. The UCD was seen by critics to be only
an electoral apparatus, maliciously referred to as "a party hanging on a
12president" or a "retinue." Since the party's 2nd Congress in Febru-
ary 1981, the UCD has been trying to update itself and to vitalize its
leadership in the midst of strong internal struggles and external
opposition.
A. THE ROLE OF SPAIN ACCORDING TO THE UCD
The 1st UCD Congress was held in October 1978 in Madrid. The
party submitted its foreign policy objectives of joining the EEC and
maintaining the bilateral defense treaty with the U.S. NATO membership
12
Javier Figuero, UCD: La Empresa que creo Adolfo Suarez
,
Barcelona, 1981, p. 13.
24

was briefly discussed and postponed for future parliamentary debate.
Emphasis was placed on Spain's unique position as a bridge between Europe
and Latin America, a friend of the Arab world, and a Mediterranean power.
All avenues were left open by the UCD government.
During 1979, criticism began to grow within Spanish political
circles. The UCD policy of keeping all options open was viewed by many
as unrealistic. The visit of President Suarez to Havana exacerbated
inter-party tensions in the UCD. Foreign policy was in a state of
shambles, and many wondered if the UCD had any foreign policy objectives
at all. Spain's membership into NATO was still awaiting debate, and
EEC membership seemed distant as well. Spain had not recognized Israel,
which is an essential part of the EEC debate. (This is still the case.)
The multiplicity of Spanish foreign policy goals was further muddled in
June 1980, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Marcelino Oreja stated that
membership in the Atlantic Alliance could be the lever to unlock, negotia-
13
tions with the European Community. Linking NATO membership with the
EEC negotiations had been avoided by the Spanish government for years,
although many observers note a similiarity in Spanish motives for
membership in both organizations.
B. UCD GOALS: EEC AND NATO
Integration in the European Community has been a long-standing
foreign policy goal for Spain. On February 9, 1962, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs for the Franco government, Fernando Maria Castiella,
13Marcelino Oreja, El Pais (newspaper) Madrid, June 15, 1980,
25

submitted the first Spanish application to the EEC; but for reasons
previously stated, it was not even considered in Brussels. The attempt to
achieve integration was relaunched with the monarchy of Juan Carlos I.
In the first address to the Cortes, the King stated:
The idea of Europe would be incomplete without a reference to the
presence of the Spanish people and without a consideration of the
works of my many predecessors. Europe should acknowledge Spain's
presence, for we Spaniards are Europeans. It is a need of the
present times for both parties to, understand this and for all to
draw the resulting consequences.
On July 28, 1977, one month after the first democratic elections,
the first UCD government officially submitted Spain's application for
membership to the EEC. Many observers believe that the government took
this step out of fear of being left out of the second enlargement, since
serious internal difficulties were already beginning to arise in the
Community. It was a long desired goal for Spanish policy-makers; but UCD
critics claim that the government took this step without having appraised
or discussed all of the political, economic, and social consequences that
would follow from this candidature.
The first parliamentary debate on foreign policy was held during the
fall of 1977. At this meeting, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Marcelino Oreja, announced that the Council of Ministers of the European
Community had unanimously resolved to give Spain an affirmative answer.
A new horizon opened for Spanish foreign policy based firmly in the West
and solidly aligned to its European neighbors. After this momentous
14
First Address to the Cortes, King Juan Carlos I, Madrid, 1976.
Dr. Antonio Marquina Barrio, in a paper presented at the Conference
of the Center for European Studies, London, November 1980, p. 8.
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political declaration, months were allowed to pass without further
explanation by the UCD government to the Spanish people on the scope of
integration. The Commission for the EEC was busy preparing its report on
the consequences of enlargement, while in Madrid, little actual work on
measures to speed integration was being accomplished. Issues such as
regional autonomy, terrorism, solidifying ties to the Arab states,
and internal government and political party reforms took precedence in
Spain during 1977. Spain moved at the pace imposed by the EEC, submitting
economic reports as requested; but the government did not actively solicit
European support. By February 1978, the UCD government was being criti-
cized for this complaisant attitude and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo was appointed
as special minister without portfolio to the European Community. Senor
Calvo Sotelo was to speed things up in Brussels. One year later, on
February 5, 1979, negotiations between the EEC and Spain were officially
opened.
Spanish government officials optimistically believed the negotia-
tions could be finished in 1980 and ratification by the European Community
members would be obtained prior to 1983. The Minister for the
European Community stated on several occasions that there was no haste in
the Spanish position since Spain no longer had any political or prestige-
related reasons driving it to quick imprudent negotiation in which
concessions might be made in the economic sphere to gain some rather
unclear points in the political sphere. He continued to add that Spain
did not need a slap on the back from anyone and the Spanish EEC negotiating
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, "Declaration regarding the EEC," in
EFE (news agency) September 15, 1978.
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position was not politically motivated, although there was a legitimate
desire to avoid unjustified delays.
In the midst of these events, the Congress of the UCD unani-
mously defined its foreign policy as European, democratic and Western.
It urged the Spanish government to continue the EEC negotiations without
sacrifice to Spain's new democratic political status. The party requested
that the government do specific things to speed integration:
1. Inform the public about the European Community.
2. Reduce the timetable for integration.
3. Correct the discrimination against Spanish agriculture by other
Mediterranean producers.
4. Immediately undertake the studies and actions required to adapt the
Spanish economic structure to the EEC, without traumatic consequences.
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo continued to state there would be no delays
19
in the negotiations but in May 1979, French President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing attributed the delays in the negotiations to Spanish President
Adolf o Suarez. Giscard d'Estaing stated Chat Suarez showed little
interest in speeding up the talks and perhaps Spain was not prepared
20politically or economically to join the EEC.
18
These remarks were reported in a variety of sources : Cinco dias
,
(newspaper) Madrid, Decemper 22, 1979; Europa Press (news agency)
November 24, 1979; El Pais , February 4, 1979.
1 8
UCD, La Solucion a Un Reto , Union Editorial, S.A., Madrid, 1979, p. 179.
19
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo interview in ABC (newspaper) Madrid,
February b, 1979.
20 Statements by French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing reported
in El Pais (newspaper) Madrid, May 6, 1979.
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Debate on Che issue began in the Spanish Parliament in June 1979.
Senor Caivo Sotelo, Minister to the European Community, presented the
economic, social, political, and historic reasons for integration, while
pointing out that there was no reasonable alternative for Spain. Other
Ministers of the UCD government stated that EEC integration would signifi-
cantly influence the direction of Spanish foreign policy because the
European Community aspired to be more than simply a coalition of European
merchants; it integrated the democratic countries of the continent in a
strong, united Europe. The Secretary of International Relations for the UCD,
Senor Javier Ruperez, marked July 28, 1977 (the date Spain submitted its
application to the EEC) as historically significant for Spain, because on
that day there was a convergence of all factors culminating in a democra-
tic system in Spain. Senor Ruperez stated that the will to make Spain a
21
member of the Community was the keystone of its entire foreign policy.
The reasons given by Senor Ruperez to the Spanish Parliament for EEC
integration were:
1. Spain wished to join the other European countries in the search for
effective solutions to the great issues confronting the continent
such as inflation, unemployment, economic revitalization, environmen-
tal protection, power supply, and guarantee of national security,
all of these problems going beyond the national framework.
2. Spain would have greater freedom within the EEC. Integration would
open new horizons for exerting influence on events and directions




affecting Spain which would otherwise be imposed from outside if
Spain did not join the Community.
3. The incorporation of Spain would entail for the Community, not
only the expansion of the economic sphere by more than 36 million
consumers and an economy ready to supply the EEC with products it
needs, but also a fuller and more balanced Community that would
gain depth and credibility, open to the concerns and possibilities
22
of the Mediterranean world.
After consideration of the arguments concerning Spain's integration
to the EEC, the Spanish Parliament, in a plenary meeting, expressed full
23
support for this objective. The Spanish media increased coverage of
the negotiations and assurances were given in both Brussels and Madrid
that progress was being made. Decisions of importance to this process,
such as the recognition of Israel by Spain, were nonetheless not forthcoming
,
Rhetorical progress in Brussels was not a substitute for real progress in
Madrid but the UCD government continued to procrastinate on taking action
to implement necessary changes. The summer of 1980 produced significant
shifts in Spanish foreign policy. French President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing called for a halt on Community enlargement until internal EEC
problems could be resolved, such as the budget and CAP reformation.
Spanish hopes for rapid integration were consequently frustrated. Sehor
Marcelino Oreja, the Spanish Foreign Minister, announced that Spanish





Marcelino Oreja, El Pais (newspaper) Madrid, June 15, 1980,
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As stated earlier, the Spanish government had continuously denied any
linkage in the two processes; but it became apparent that EEC negotiations
would take much longer than anticipated, NATO began to look more appealing
to the faltering UCD government.
In September 1980, Sehor Eduardo Punset was appointed the new
Minister for Relations with the EEC and together with Minister Calvo
Sotelo, who was appointed Vice-President for Economic Affairs, gave
greater unity and effectiveness to the integration process. The two
Spanish ministers insisted that the solutions to the economic crisis
in Spain were not distinct from the economic mechanisms which would have
25
to be adopted to achieve EEC integration. They advocated working
directly with the EEC to devise formulas which could be channeled to the
Spanish government to expedite the task of economic reform. This program
has been successful under the government of President Calvo Sotelo and
constant liaison continues between Madrid and Brussels. The EEC
integration process for Spain is complex, but it should be noted that
between 1977 and 1980 internal political events took precedence over
accomplishing tasks to speed integration. Rhetoric will not succeed in
gaining Spain's admission to the EEC; substantial Spanish economic reform
is needed.
25 Interviews with Sehor Punset and Sehor Calvo Sotelo in El Pais
(newspaper) Madrid, October 8, 1980 and November 14, 1980.
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V. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. COMPOSITION
The European Community (EC) unites ten nations — Belgium, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark., and most recently, Greece (Jan-
uary 1, 1981) — in a common desire to establish a peaceful and prosper-
ous Europe moving towards the closer union of the people of Europe. The
Community is more than an international organization of states and yet
less than a real federation. The EC literature states that "the EC is an
institutional framework, for the construction of a united Europe." The
idea of Community is to foster common European policies, programs, laws
and regulations which will improve and sustain economic well-being in
Europe, guarantee peace among member states, and help other nations with
trade and aid.
B. TREATIES
Three treaties form the legal basis on which the Community rests and
outline the scope of its activities.
1. The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) Treaty of 1951
The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) Treaty created the
pilot project for European economic integration by pooling the member
2 ft
"The European Community at a Glance," Delegation of the Commission
of the European Communities
,




countries' resources of coal and steel in a common market unhampered
by national boundaries
.
2. The European Economic Community (EEC Common Market) Treaty
of 1957
The European Economic Community (EEC Common Market) Treaty was
designed to combine the member countries ' total economic resources in an
economic union wherein goods, persons, services and capital would move
freely and where common policies would prevail for such fields as foreign
trade, agriculture, and transport.
3. The 1957 European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) Treaty
The European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) Treaty provided
the framework to coordinate Community activities in developing a powerful
nuclear industry pledged to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
C. INSTITUTIONS
The main institutions involved in the running of the European Com-
munity are the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European Parlia-
ment, and the Court of Justice. The Council of Ministers is the EC's
principal decision-making body. The government of each nation has a seat
on the Council. The Foreign Minister is usually a country's main repre-
sentative, but a government is free to send any of its Ministers to
Council meetings. For some particularly important decisions by the
Council, unanimous agreement is necessary, but in principle, most deci-
sions can be taken by a majority. The votes of the members are weighted
according to population. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom
have ten votes each; Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands have five
votes each; Denmark and Ireland have three votes each; and Luxembourg has
33

two votes. A total of 45 votes is needed for a proposal to be passed,
however, the EC literature states that "the Council never imposes a
decision on a member in a matter that the member considers to be of vital
27
national interest."
The Commission is responsible for seeing that the treaties are
implemented and for initiating Community policy and administration. This
arm of the Community has 14 members chosen by agreement of the Community
governments and these Commissioners are chosen to act in the Community's
interest, not in the interests of their national origin. Commissioners
are appointed for four years and can only be removed by a vote of censure
from the European Parliament. Each Commissioner heads a department with
special responsibilities for one area of Community policy, such as
economic affairs, agriculture, energy, etc. Discussions are held between
a Commissioner's department and interested parties and the Commission
formulates draft proposals which are then sent to the Council for passage.
The European Parliament advises the Council of Ministers on Commis-
sion proposals, with the Council determining the budget and exerts some
political supervision over the Council and Commission. The Parliament
has 434 members who represent the citizens of all the countries of the
Community. Members are directly elected and serve for five years.
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are each represented by 81
members, the Netherlands by 25 members, Belgium and Greece by 24, Denmark
by 16, Ireland by 15, and Luxembourg by six members. The members of the
Parliament do not sit in national groups, but in political party groups,






Socialists, the European People's Party (Christian Democrats), the
European Democrats (Conservative), the Communists, the Liberal and
Democratic Group, and the European Progressive Democrats (Gaullists and
28
allies). Parliament meets on the average once a month and debates
issues presented by its committees. The decisions made by the Parliament
are not binding on the Council of Ministers but are considered influen-
tial. It has the power to dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds majority
vote and also has the power to reject the Council's proposals for the
Community budget.
The Court of Justice settles the legal disputes involving Community
laws. It is composed of ten judges, one from each Community country
and each serves for six years. Judgments of the Court are binding in
each member country and it can settle disputes between Community institu-
tions and member states, between institutions, or between member states
themselves.
Three times a year, a European Council is called where the Heads of
Governments meet to discuss broad areas of policy — the EC's equivalent
of the Summit Meeting.
The Community has funds — the European Regional Development Fund,
and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund — to help
regions with economic difficulties. Special assistance is available
to the coal and steel industries, while the European Investment Sank
provides finance for industrial development. The Community supports










associations with other countries, in 1963, the Community signed the
first Association Convention with 18 African states in Yaoundi , Cameroon.
This was expanded in 1975 to become the first Lome Convention (Lome I)
and in 1979 Lome II established a contractual relationship between over
sixty African, Carribean, and Pacific countries granting these countries
food aid and a system of generalized preferences for their industrial
goods and some agricultural exports to the EC. All the Community coun-
tries are also members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
,
the Council of Europe, and, with the special case of Ireland as the sole
29




Table II lists the European Community's 12 largest customers and
12 largest suppliers during 1979; it should be noted that Spain was
the Community's fifth largest customer and seventh largest supplier.
31
Table III ' is used to illustrate the growth of Community trade
between 1958 and 1979, in internal and external markets. The statistics
seem to indicate that the main purposes of the Community, to promote and
sustain the economic growth of Europe, are being accomplished, even







"Basic Economic and Social Statistics," European Community
Statistical Office
,
Office for Official Publications of the European
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GROWTH OF COMMUNITY TRADE
($ millions)
1958 1979
Intra E.C. (9) 23,241 611,146
E.G. (9) with rest of the world 45,756 564,829
Imports ($ millions)
From U.S.A.























Throughout the 1960 's, when the Common Market was being set up, and
up until 1973, strong growth served to oil the wheels of integration and
cushion the social impact of structural changes in industry and agricul-
ture. Now the economic climate is not as favorable for the integration
of new members or the steady growth of old members. The last few years
have been stormy ones for the world economy. The disruption of the
international monetary system following the United States' decision in
1971 to discontinue dollar convertibility, the quadrupling of oil prices
at the end of 1973, and the serious payments imbalance and exchange rate
fluctuations which appeared as a result, contributed to the start in 1974
of the worst recession since World War II. All of these factors have had
a severe impact on the European Community's level of economic growth and
volume of world trade.
The expansion of economic activity in the Community has slowed down
considerably since 1974, and is expected to remain sluggish in the near
future. Under these circumstances, the expectations for improvement in
the EC's employment situation are grim. Inflationary pressures also
exist with rapidly rising consumer prices. During 1978, the number of
unemployed in the Community exceeded 6 million and rises in consumer
32prices topped 7 percent. Many of the EC's industries are experienc-
ing difficulties. Iron and steel, in particular, are running well below
full capacity despite rationalization measures adopted at the Community
32Commission of the European Communities, "Opinion on Spain's
Application for Membership," Bulletin of the European Communities
,
Supplement 9/78. transmitted to the Council by the Commission on
29 November 1978, Belgium, 1979, p. 11.
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level and in a number of member states. The shipyards' order books
remain empty, and restructuring is necessary in the textile industry. The
general slowdown in the economy has also hit the agricultural sector,
where the unsatisfactory world trade situation has, by causing a deterior-
ation in the trade balance, focused attention on the deficits in the
agricultural trade of some member states. The economic crisis has also
effected the Community's external policy especially in relation to the
Lome II Convention signatories , limiting the scope of the commercial
33policy. The EC has tried to maintain the value of these agreements
by applying a diversified policy to the different countries and regions.
The Community budget is also seen as a major problem with a multitude
of political ramifications. The 1981 Mitterrand election in France
could fray the strong bonds which existed for seven years between
Valery Giscard d'Estaing's France and Helmut Schmidt's West Germany.
Their collaboration resulted in a protectionist farm policy that bene-
fited France's farmers and was paid for by West Germany and Britain.
Table IV shows Che relationship between the net gainers and net contribu-
34
tors to the Common Market's 1981 budget.
It is questionable whether the French-German relationship will
remain as unequal or exclusive as it was in the past and this change
will effect the political forces within the European Community. President
Mitterrand has indicated that, while France's relationship with West






Paul Lewis, "A New French Factor in Europe's Equation," The
New York Times
,




NET GAINERS AND NET LOSERS TO THE COMMON
MARKET'S 1981 BUDGET



















in the French-German connection has caused speculation that Great
Britain may have an opportunity to play a bigger role in European affairs
especially in the restructuring of the Community budget, a process
that began in June 1981 in Luxembourg. In budget matters, as indicated
by Table IV, West Germany's natural ally is not France but Great Britain,
the only other net contributor to the Community's $24 billion annual
budget, most of which at the present time is spent on subsidizing its
35inefficient farmers. The budget debate is about Europe's future







European Monetary System, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the
enlargement of the Community to include Spain and Portugal are all major
debates which will be tackled by the European Community in the near
future. Table V shows the proposed numerical participation in the
Community by the countries seeking membership and by the present mem-
bers. (The levels proposed by Greece were accepted by the Community
in January 1981.) It should be noted that due to population , size , and
GNP
,
Spain will become an important member of the Community upon accep-
tance of its application.
Commission of the European Communities, "Enlargement of the
Community," Bulletin of the European Communities , Supplement 2/78,



















































5 ~> *T T XT «T 02 fcNJ CM C\J CSJ Ol 0*1 en »43















*J 01 r*» p** r^ c^.











Tl B en a*





a. C -— T3
41 *-* 4) "°
.O *-> —. — — — .0 in «r rr «r \o lunvO


















Q- O O vi- ro jlQOrs.ornno^wcnow
>» ar r». vi 3 —
L. O Ol "3 O — u"»30O ,-0«yp>*40CNj<ra0—<cocvi
*-> —. ^» £ —






01 viN — c
— 4-> <43 O >/10Py0^cypoOc\jr^fNat\jTr
\n -o ^ — P
— <yi .— -4^o^Of\iu3nu»a\cr»ifl*rno









•O u « = 10 rn co icvi V4"> *o ^4<j» m vo
c 0 v n
>4_ J_ O





— C —4 1_
14. «> — 3
>» 1— S—1 -a j4M "3


















4) CO *-4 41 —




4-f <z — >.
yi TJ 1 S 4J
Q. 41 a O
3 v^ •3 «l 41
O 41 u
U T -3 »j t—
Ol CM 01 0
"O *J <_»
C 31 c OO l/l
41 C 3 <_>
41 — O w UJ
J > CC c
4J »0 •») 41







O o w — —
41 -»3 41 #— 4-J
••« »-> *J 71 -J 4-* L. TT) >s
u jr ^ -3 U1 O c -J
w <* aiu- *-l 3 ^3
c — -3 C
41 CVJ c u —
1
.^J ^1 J
*^ a 1 41 ^J n
41 en — 4-» 14_ O a —
>4» 1—
'





-- c 1— u u 3 n L. ]/l 41
-3 f i 41 c u TJ 3 a =. 3U 3 11 O a *j 41
41 t/i -1 - O t5 •~> <_) cn£ .— c T 1- J C_) t/i u v-» 1.
4J 41 : c D <n
> -a ^ ^73 1— O d — —
c 41 c tyi CI 41 VI 4J c;




U c 3. >1
c ~ O c j a. 41 — 3 3 1 41
a UJ — vT ^ ^» > 3 V c
f— •*-
_; O 3 t_ 41 C ^. -J. *-»
«J >y-i (->
-J. j. .1-1 O a •^1
^ •D O *-» — — *-
Q. a. 1- - '4_ 41 —
>
4-> r.
3. o «-J A j
U 1) u 3 u — 41 w
•— —
'J u r" 3 — V 3 1- y> 3
44J *_» l_ L. U u •— VI ^1 u 41 — a.
k. 1. 3 3 > -/> VI .-1 *J ^j
fl « a O U *o T rj 3 a — hJ 3
O. 0. /1 1/1 1 CO \_ i_ /I <_> '•— — j
*-h <Nj m t '-n via M131 O
43

VI. THE SPANISH ECONOMY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. GENERAL CONDITION
The purpose of this section is to present an overview of the
Spanish economy in relation to the European Community. Particular
emphasis will be placed on the problems of unemployment, agriculture, and
trade. For years Spain has been trying to get its economy in a position
favorable to acceptance for membership in the European Community.
Spanish democracy had the bad luck to be born just as a worldwide
recession was beginning to bite deeply. While a succession of governments
wrestled with the post-Franco transition, the economy stagnated. The
unemployment rate has soared past 12 percent, the inflation rate has
rarely dropped much below 20 percent, and foreign debts have mounted
steadily. Free access to the Common Market—Spain's biggest trading
partner—would theoretically boost Spanish exports and bring a flood of
foreign investment into the country. Equally important, an entree to
Europe would be a powerful political buttress for Spain's beleaguered
democracy
—
powerful enough, perhaps, to deter future takeovers.
Community membership has always had high priority in Madrid. In
July 1980, when French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing suggested a
moratorium on further expansion until the Ten could sort out their Common
Agricultural Program (CAP) and budget problems, hopes in Madrid for
accelerated entrance were dampened. Giscard was expressing a genuine
concern within the Community, but he was also echoing his own farmers,
who vehemently oppose the admission of another major producer of wine,
44

olive oil, and vegetables to their markets. To the Spaniards, that
attitude obscured the Community's democratic purpose in favor of narrow
economic concerns.
In March 1981, Spanish Foreign Minister, Jose Perez-Llorca y
Rodrigo, urged the EC to overlook, the technical difficulties surrounding
Spanish admission and concentrate on the political goals. The results of
this plea were that the EC did what it could. The then EC Council
President Christoph van der Klaauw reaffirmed the EC's commitment to
Spanish democracy, and he stated that the original schedule for the talks
37
would be honored by the Commission. The council is also expected to
approve up to $120 billion annually in development loans to Spain during
the year before accession. (Accession is tentatively planned for January,
1984.) These funds will be provided by the European Investment Bank for
use in aiding depressed regions and small businesses.
Over the summer of 1981, Spain and the Community discussed a number
of relatively simple issues — EURATOM (the energy policies of the EC),
capital flows, and the customs union. Agriculture, fisheries, and other
more complex questions will be handled later. The remodelling of Spain
on a Western European basis is one of the few givens of the political
scene in that country. Spain sees EEC membership as necessary to its
future economic and political development and also as fundamental to







B. THE 1970 EEC-SPAIN TRADE AGREEMENT
After World War II, the Franco regime, as mentioned earlier, was
ostracized by both Western and Eastern European governments. Over the
years, repeated attempts by Spanish foreign policy leaders to establish
solid European links were doomed to failure due to Spain's form of
government, Fascist Franco. As early as 1962, the Spanish government
expressed interest in an association with the EEC, possibly leading to
eventual full integration. Exploratory talks were held from 1964 to 1966
with a view to negotiating a purely commercial agreement. The negotia-
tions proper lasted from 1967 to 1970, and the EEC-Spain Agreement,
o o
signed on 29 June 1970, came into force on 1 October 1970.
Under the provisions of the agreement, the contracting parties agreed
to consolidate and extend their economic and trade relations; establish
the basis for a progressive expansion of trade with each other; and
emphasize the EEC's desire to develop economic and trade relations with
countries bordering on the Mediterranean. The specific terms of this
agreement varied depending on the economic sector involved. In the
industrial sector, the Community applies tariff concessions of ^0 percent
to 60 percent, depending on the product, to nearly all imports originating
in Spain, while about half of the agricultural imports are granted a
tariff preference of between 25 percent and 60 percent. Spain offers
tariff concessions of 25 percent to 60 percent, again depending on the
39product, to a sizeable proportion of its imports from the Community.
"Spain and the European Community," March 1981, op_. cit .
,
p. 1.
39Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 182, 1970,
Belgium, 1970, p. 2.
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This agreement lasted until 1975 when the Community broke off negotia-
tions with Spain in protest against human rights violations. A press
release by Che European Parliament dated March 16, 1974 stated: "Continual
violations perpetuated by the Spanish government against human rights and
the rights of the citizen and its intolerance of the rights of minorities
40
Hinder the entry of Spain into the Common Market." Alter the corona-
tion of King Juan Carlos I in November of 1975, contact was resumed but
Spain indicated that it now wished to conduct its relations with the
Community with a view to future membership.
In 1977, Spain applied for full membership; and as stated earlier,
negotiations continue. The sectoral issues which are being discussed in
these negotiations include the steel industry (Spain is one of the
Community's three chief suppliers); the fisheries; textiles and footwear,
and agriculture. Other economic considerations under negotiation include
a customs union and freedom of movement in the industrial sector; taxation;
capital movement; membership in the E.C.S.C. and EURATOM; transportaion;
resources; and regional and external policies. As is evident, the
procedures for Spanish entrance into the EEC are extremely complex but
the alternative is a Spain which is very much outside looking in, not a
fundamental part of the European continent.
C. SPAIN AND THE EEC-ECONOMICS
The EEC is by far Spain's most important market, source of tourism
and investment, and source of imports, while this is true for all
40




four sectors of activity, it is particularly striking in the use of
exports. Spain's 1977 exports went to EEC countries to the extent
of 45.6 percent of the total. In 1978, this figure was 46.3 percent.
Compared to the United States' share of Spain's exports, which was 9.8
41
percent in 1977 and 9.3 percent in 1978, this is extremely significant.
The trend in recent years has been toward a relative decline in exports
to the United States and a striking increase in exports to the EEC.
In the import area, the EEC accounted in 1977 for 34.4 percent and in
1978 for 34.6 percent of Spain's imports. The EEC investment in Spain
from 1960 to 1975 was 34 percent of the total for foreign investment and
has been further accentuated recently. While 30 percent came from West
Germany alone, that country was far from being the sole major EEC investor,
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Italy all invest in Spain, and
over two-thirds of the tourists coming to Spain are from EC countries
—
42
over 21 million in 1977.
For the EEC as well, Spain's importance has grown greatly. While
in 1958, Spain ranked twentieth as a source of imports, by 1979 Spain
ranked seventh. As a customer, Spain's relative importance to the EEC
has grown even more. In 1958, it was in the sixteenth position as a
market for EEC goods and by 1979, it was fifth. (Table II shows these
figures.) Within the Community, the main purchasers of Spanish goods
continue to be in the following order of impportance: France, West
41 Anuario Estadistico de Espana








Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. Together in 1979, these four coun-
43
tries bought 39 percent of all goods exported by Spain. This
concentration of purchasing reflects the European and multinational
companies' investment in Spain using the country in part or substan-
tially as an export base.
This is especially the case of the expanding motor vehicle industry.
The presence in Spain of Citroen-Peugeot , Talbot, and Renault, with
French control, bears importantly on France's purchases from Spain.
44
Talbot, for instance, invoices all its European sales through France.
Using Spain as an export base is financially beneficial to these companies
and last summer's French-engineered delay in the Spanish entry talks
caused great concern among the multinationals.
U.S. companies have also made huge investments in the Iberian Peninsula
in the hope of using that country as a platform for tariff-free exports
into the much larger EEC market and significant delays in Spanish member-
ship could cast serious doubts on the value of their investments.
American multinationals ranging from Ford to Dow Chemical, and including
Oscar Meyer, Wrangler, 3M, International Harvester, Abbott Laboratories,
and Procter ana Gamble have been literally pouring money into Spain in
45
order to reap the benefits of EEC membership. These companies
had hoped to see Spain a full member of the EEC by early 1983 and had
43
Robert Graham, "Spanish Exports," Financial Times of London
,







"Spain: An EC Tiff Imperils U.S. Investments," Business Week
,
July 28, 1980, p. 54.
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invested substantial money on that date. Their opinion of the French
delaying tactics was that Giscard's action was a ploy to gain votes from
the French farmers in the Presidential election. The ploy obviously did
not work., and now all eyes are on the Mitterrand government, which has
been vigorously pursuing internal French economic reform in conjunction
with EEC reform.
D. THE ECONOMIC DEBATE
The economic issues between the EEC and Spain are complex. The
two sides have approached entry from two distinct poles. The Spanish
have sought in the lengthy negotiations to protect their young industries
with a long transition period, while pressing for free circulation of
their agricultural products. The Community, on the other hand, has
viewed Spanish industry—not entirely correctly, according to the
46
Financial Times —as aggressive, heavily government-supported,
low-cost, and capable of ruthless dumping practices, which would severely
injure the Community's ailing industries. Therefore, the Community has
sought to negotiate a shorter transition time for lowering tariff barriers
on industrial products. As for agricultural products, the Community,
pressed by specific demands from France and Italy, would like to see its
own goods protected as long as possible.
In relative terms, Spain's agricultural exports to the EEC have
declined over the past decade. It is reported that they once represented
45 percent of total exports to the EEC; and now they account for just 25
46,
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percent of that total. The reason is that significant progress has
been made in the Spanish export mix, which now includes industrial and
consumer goods. The multinationals have also contributed greatly to this
change in the Spanish export pattern to the EEC.
The thorniest issue in the debate is, and will probably remain, Spanish
agricultural exports. Europe and especially Northern Europe needs the
kinds of products that Spain is geared to producting in quantity: citrus,
Mediterranean fruits, and vegetables. At the present time, Community pro-
ducers of such competing items as citrus, tomatoes, olive oil, grapes, wine
and canned products are protected. In a free market, the Spanish believe,
they can undersell these producers because their production costs, including
wages, are cheaper. Fears of this practice have produced violent incidents
in Northern Spain between the French and Spanish farmers. Another issue
involved is what the Spaniards believe to be discriminatory EEC preferential
trade agreements with other non-member Mediterranean producers. The reduc-
tion in the common external tariff applied to the three Maghreb countries
produce is 80 percent, and for Israel it is a 60 percent minimum. But
for Spain, the reduction is only 40 percent and the Spanish claim that
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the other countries have more favorable terms of trade with the EEC.
A side issue in the economic debate includes the status of the
Canary Islands within an EEC context. Presently, the Canaries are a
duty-free zone and depend heavily on this special position for economic
survival. The Community prefers not to accept duty-free zones. Another










market may be adversely affected by Spanish entry to the EEC when these
countries discover that their goods are subject to higher tarrifs.
As previously stated, the economic issues confronting Spain and the
EEC are extremely complex. The negotiating road to Spanish entry will be
long and arduous, but the need for Spain, if it ever wants to become a
fully modern industrial country, to learn to stand up and reap the
benefits of European competition, is clear.
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VII. THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. COMMUNITY GOALS
The prospects facing an enlarged EEC still loom in the future.
Many reports have been submitted by Spain to the EC Commission and the
Commission has done comparison analysis of the present members and the
states requesting accession (Spain and Portugal). As a criteria to judge
the outcome of the Community enlargement, one must look at two of the
major goals of the EC: (a) the promotion and strengthening of democracy
and economic prosperity in the member-countries, and (b) the growth of
external trade of the Community and the strengthening of its role in
international affairs as well as the liberalization and development of its
49international economic trade. Will the enlargement of the EC in its
present form assure these goals or bring EC members closer to them? This
is the basic problem now facing the European Community.
The central elements of the EC are the customs union with its tradi-
tion of external liberalism, a developing common commercial policy, and
the Common Agricultural Policy. These elements influence the external
trade of the member countries, but they provide few effective means of
changing member countries' internal policies to adapt to a common market.
Inequalities in the economic development of EC member countries form part
of the basis for the current internal EEC reform debate. Community
enlargement has been forced to a secondary position during 1981 while the
49Official Journal of the European Communities, Documentation
Section, 1970. The Terms EEC and EC are used interchangeably dependeing
on the Source used.
53

Commission seeks viable means of resolving unacceptable internal conditions
prior to acceptance of Spain and Portugal. The disparities which exist
between EC members and candidate countries are shown in Table VI. As is
evident, it will be hard to reconcile the interests of the economically-
stronger countries with those of the developing countries, and this is
the task which now faces the EEC.
TABLE VI
PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET













Source: OECD-Observer , March 1979.
B. COMMUNITY PROBLEMS
Specific major problems within the European Community include the
following:
1. Successful economic activity abroad for EEC and non-EEC countries
is threatened from many directions. Improvement in the global
economic condition could rectify this situation but continuation of
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the current stagnation threatens the fiber that binds the EEC
together.
2. There exists a dilemma of conflicting interests within the EEC.
This opposes those who favor European protectionist policies
(principally those countries in the poorest economic situation) to
those seeking greater progress abroad (notably West Germany).
3. The political stability of the southern flank of Europe is question-
able. Most observers agree that EEC enlargement could contribute
to the political stabilization policies in the candidate countries;
but doubts exist regarding the EEC's ability to effectively handle a
political crisis in a member country.
4. The EEC negotiations to revise the budget arrangements and to reform
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have been very slow and
tedious serving to exacerbate imbalances within the Community.
Critics note that the Commission should take a firm lead in reform,
and that the longer the Commission continues to accommodate the
views of member states, the longer they will take to change.
C. SPANISH PROBLEMS
Enlargement of the EEC will create a new set of problems for the
candidate countries. It appears that the Spanish government has not yet
devised a comprehensive plan to meet the consequences of EEC integration.
Political parties and government officials have publicly stated that EEC
accession would be advantageous for Spain, but there has been little
Joan Pearce, "The CAP: A Guide to the Commission's New Proposals,"
The World Today
,
London, Chatham House, September 1981.
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actual planning done to ready the country for integration. As one
government official interviewed in Madrid stated,
EEC integration will cause a major Shockwave to hit the Spanish
economy. Some businesses and industries will survive the shock, and
become more efficient in the long run. Others will fail and be
crushed by the competition. This Shockwave is necessary to propel
the Spanish economy into the twentieth century.
Some of the major problems which may face Spain as a member of the
EEC are the following:
1. Integration into the existing structure of the EEC will expose
Spanish industry to dangerous pressure of superior competition from
outside. The protective barriers against this competition existing
up to now in the form of high tariffs and national industrial
policies will have to be removed to a large degree.
2. Only relatively small parts of Spanish capital and labor are
engaged in industry and in large-scale internationally competitive
agriculture. The majority of the capital and labor in Spain is
engaged in small and medium-scale industry and small agriculture
enterprises. Growth in these sectors has been possible due to
protected national markets and national industrial policies with
high subsidies. Without these crutches, a large majority of
Spanish capitalists, workers, and small farmers may initially
suffer big losses in profits and wages by integration into the
EEC.
52
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3. Wages in Spain will have to remain at a low level during the
integration process. This runs contrary to the peoples' expecta-
tions of elevated wage levels similar to northern Europe.
4. Spain's economic relationship to Third World countries will have
to be revised to meet Community goals.
To reiterate, the Spanish government does not have a comprehensive
position on the possible consequences of EEC integration. With respect
to agriculture in the 1st and 2nd Congress of the governing UCD, the
party indicated that Spanish agriculture will simply have to follow the
EEC guidelines, foreseeing far-reaching changes in these guidelines due to
the scheduled CAP reformation. The need for industrial conversion has
been stated, together with the restructuring of sectors and increased
productivity to face a level of competition for which Spanish industry is
not prepared. New legal regulations must also be developed for companies,
including a gradual liberalization of trade. These changes have been advo-
cated to ease the transition of Spain's accession to the EEC, but specific
programs are not yet in place.
In financial and monetary policy, the lack, of competitiveness of the
Spanish financial system is recognized. A new process is advocated which
would gradually allow more freedom to financial institutions. Nothing
has yet been done to monetary policy, although at UCD government level
acknowledgement has been made that Spain must adopt the European Monetary
System. This system will impose a currency discipline on Spain and
substantially change the country's economy. Entry of Spain to the EEC
will naturally entail the entry of the peseta in the orbit of the German
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mark and the end of the peseta-dollar subservience. Adherence to
the European Monetary System is being delayed, even though this will be a
prerequisite to EEC accession.
Changes in economic, industrial, agricultural, and monetary policy
are being reserved for the membership negotiations. Special emphasis is
placed by the Spanish government on establishing long transitional
periods after EEC accession to deal with these crucial issues. Spain
should immediately implement a coherent economic plan for EEC membership,
since the types of structural changes necessary will take years to
accomplish and could be initiated at the present time. Internal political
pressures have so dominated the Spanish government during 1981, that
essential goals are being neglected, such as getting on with the steps
necessary for EEC membership. The Spanish media have recently pointed
out that negotiations with the EEC have entered their fourth year; but
difficulties within the EEC have increased, therefore putting Spain at a
54disadvantage. To postpone critical issues until after the entry
offers no solution. Immediate problems such as the perceived discrimina-
tion against Spanish agricultural products by EEC members may continue
indefinitely, or at least until Spain is a Community member. Time should
be used now for the streamlining of Spanish administrative and institu-
tional practices using the EEC methods in monetary policy, taxation,
banking, trade, and industrial reform. Final adjustments should not
53
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be left to the last moment. The present interval, enforced by the EEC
problems of budget and CAP, offers the Spanish government a breathing





VIII. THE REFORM OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP)
A. THE CAP
In order to analyze the primary reason for delay in Spanish entry
to the EEC, it is necessary to examine the CAP and the Commission's new
proposals for reform. At the end of May 1980, agreement was reached within
the EEC on resolving the unacceptable situation created by the United
Kingdom's contribution to the budget of the European Community for 1980 and
1981. (Refer to Table IV, Net Gains and Net Losses to the Common Market's
1981 Budget, page 41.) To avoid repeated negotiations, the EEC decided to
seek, a more lasting solution to the problems. Accordingly, the Commission
was given a mandate to examine the development of the Community policies
with a view to proposing structural changes in the budget that would
prevent the recurrence of unacceptable situations. During the last week of
June 1981, the Commission presented its report on the mandate, a major
feature of which was a section setting out new guidelines for the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Spain's accession to the SEC has been delayed,
in part, due to the complexity of these reforms. Examination of the
long-standing economic arguments for reforming the CAP and the budgetary
pressures that are now making some change inevitable within the EEC will
clarify some of the dilemmas surrounding Spain's accession to the EEC.
B. PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
Those who believe the CAP is in need of reform usually view its failings
as stemming chiefly from the way that the price mechanism has evolved and
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the central role that it plays. When common prices were established
throughout the Community, they were set at a high level because West
Germany, while accepting some reduction, declined to lower its prices to
the level of other countries. At the same time, for a large part of
agricultural production, intervention mechanisms were set up which
ensured that farmers could sell all they produced at a guaranteed price.
The high price level and guaranteed prices, together with improved
productivity, encouraged production to rise, causing the Community to
reach and then exceed self-sufficiency in some products, notably dairy
products, sugar and cereals. Because prices were the principal
determinant of farm income, there were political and social arguments
against holding them down. As surpluses grew, they became an increasing
burden on the Community budget which has to cover the cost of disposing
of them through paying for storage, destruction, or export restrictions
to producers who sell to third countries at prices below those prevailing
in the Community.
The adverse effects of the CAP's price mechanisms extend further than
the budget. The resources that are used to produce goods for which there
is no market at the high Community price could be more efficiently applied
in another sector. Furthermore, because of the system of guaranteed
prices, price competition within the Community has been inadequate to bring
about the division of labor that should have resulted from the establishment
of free trade among member states.
Pearce, op cit .
,
p. 339.
Reflections on the Common Agricultural Policy," Bulletin of the
European Communities
, Supplement 6/80, Brussels, Belgium, 1981, p. 17.
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The CAP has also exacerbated imbalances within the Community and
within the agricultural sector. There is now greater divergence in farm
income, partly because large-scale farmers are better able to take advantage
of the CAP, and partly because the CAP provides more support for some
products than for others. Differentiated treatment of products results in
some member states, notably Mediterranean producers, receiving proportion-
ally less support. Imbalances have also been generated by the transfer of
resources from consumers to producers due to the high level of Community
food prices, and from taxpayers to farmers as a result of surpluses. These
transfers are reflected at the national level in the form of trade-generated
flows and financial flows through the EEC budget from member states that
are net importers of agricultural products to those that are net exporters.
The CAP's system of external protection has also been criticized on the
grounds that it reduces export outlets for third countries, depresses world
prices, and destabilizes world markets.
Pressure has been building for CAP reform and the proposed Community
enlargement, to include Spain and Portugal, both significant agricultural
exporters, has forced the EEC to deal directly with the problem. The
British budget problem points directly to the ironies of the CAP, in that,
despite being one of the poorer members of the Community, Britain has come
to make the largest contribution to the budget. (Refer to Table IV.) This
happens primarily because Britain is a large importer of agricultural








expenditure, which accounts for the lion's share of the EEC budget.
To furnish the funds needed to fulfill the CAP requirements, the Community
utilizes a European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),
which is financed by farm import levies, customs duties, and a portion of
the value added tax (VAT), which is not to exceed one percent, supplied
by the national governments. At present, nearly 75 percent of the annual
59Community budget is required to administer the CAP.
For Britain's contribution to the EEC budget to be noticeably reduced,
the proportion of EEC funds spent on agriculture would have to be greatly
cut back., or another adjustment mechanism would have to be devised.
According to the Commission's assessment, the reasons for the adverse
British net budget contribution are (a) Britain's small, efficiently run
farm sector receives a relatively small amount of the Community's very
extensive spending on agriculture; (b) Britain still imports a substantial
amount from non-Community states , thus paying a larger share of the
customs duties; and (c) many British products are subject to the value
added tax, resulting in a high British VAT payment into EEC coffers.
A second source of pressure within the Community is the increase in
total budget expenditure. Revenue is made up of agricultural levies,
customs duties, and up to one percent of the value added tax base (VAT) of
The largest part (95 percent) of the European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) is spent on supporting guaranteed prices.
(Community Bulletin, 8 December 1980, p. 17.)
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member states. For several years, expenditure was well within the limit
of these Community resources; but, as it rose, it took, up an increasing
proportion of the value added tax and began to approach the ceiling of one
percent. The nearing of the ceiling demonstrates that the financial
arrangements of the CAP were devised for a situation where products were in
deficit and are much less suited to dealing with surpluses. As the Commun-
ity has moved from deficit to surplus in some products, potential revenue
from import levies has declined, while expenditure on disposing of surpluses
has risen.
Expenditure in excess of the ceiling will be necessary when Spain and
Portugal join the Community, which is officially scheduled for January
1984. Once the number of Mediterranean member states is increased, there
will also be growing pressure for the CAP to treat southern products in the
same way as northern products. This could mean either extending the amount
of support given to southern products or curbing that for northern products.
It is essential to note that enlargement of the EEC will serve to magnify
CO
imbalances already existing within the Community.
C. GUIDELINES FOR CAP REFORMATION
In the Commission's report to the Community, the CAP was commended
for having achieved positive results over the past twenty years. It
fulfilled key objectives of the Treaty of Rome: security of food supplies,
satisfaction of consumer's requirements, increased productivity, and higher
Op cit .
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farm incomes. The Commission report called attention to the fact that all
this had been done for a total cost of 0.5 percent of the Community GNP,
which is not excessive when compared either with what it would have cost
each member to run its own national policy or with the costs of the policies
of the Community's main competitors.
Recalling the instruction in the original mandate that the basic
principles of the CAP should not be called into question, the Commission's
report confirms that these remain essential. The three basic principles
of the CAP are:
1. A unified market, implying common prices, which enables goods to
circulate freely.
2. Community preference, which protects the unified market against
imports from third countries.
3. Financial solidarity, which entails channelling the financing of
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the CAP through a Community institution.
The report stated that it was not possible or desirable to discard the
mechanisms of the CAP, though to adjust them is both possible and necessary.
The existence of surpluses in most major products underlines this necessity.
The Commission recommended improved control of surpluses, concluding that
guaranteed prices should not be fixed with respect solely to farm income
considerations but should reflect market realities more than they have, and
that the guarantee should no longer be open-ended. Having established this










frame of reference, the Commission's report set out the following six
guidelines for future decisions on the CAP:
1. Price policy and export policy are highly interdependent, in the
context of the Commission's recommendation that the Community
should aim gradually to align guaranteed prices with prices based
on a better organized world market. This could be achieved by
pursuing a firm policy toward prices within the Community and
adopting a more active export policy designed to stabilize world
prices by means of cooperative agreements with other major exporters,
possibly supplemented by long-term export contracts. This would
entail short-term continuation of the existing policy of keeping
Community price increases to modest proportions and long-term
collaboration with other major suppliers to raise the level of
world prices.
Eventually, the Commission feels that this would narrow the gap
between EEC prices and world prices to reflect market realities.
2. Production targets are proposed to make producers more aware of
market realities. These would be set for all major products to
signify the volume of production that the Community wants to guarantee
at full price. Once the target was reached, producers would no
longer receive the full price
.
3. Structural policy should be tailored to the needs of individual
agricultural regions. The Commission recommended that measures be
prepared to assist in resolving the problems of Mediterranean agri-
culture prior to Community enlargement. These will be medium-term
programs covering an integrated policy for incomes, markets,
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production, and structures, and involving both financial and
agricultural instruments of the Community.
4. Income support subsidies are envisaged as a possible supplementary
measure to be used only in specific circumstances established by the
Community. Due to the high cost involved in these subsidies, the
Commission recommended that they be confined to help only certain
small producers.
5. Quality control and financial control should be reinforced within
the Community. Quality control would help reduce surpluses by
excluding some production from the market and contribute to EEC
export promotion. Tighter financial control would increase the
Commission's role in regulating the management of Community funds in
member states.
6. National aids (such as loans) are to be subjected to greater scrutiny
by the Commission.
These Commission guidelines for CAP reform are still being debated
within the European Economic Community. The Commission has devised propo-
sals that would leave the principles and mechanisms of the CAP essentially
intact while adjusting the mechanisms to ensure that budget expenditure
rises less rapidly than Community resources. At least for the next few
years, the main burden of restructuring the budget will be left to a budget
mechanism, if these guidelines are followed. The assessment that seems to
have guided the Commission is that those member states that most want the
CAP changed, the United Kingdom and West Germany, are primarily concerned
Pearce, op. cit
. , pp. 344-346.
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with the CAP's budget implications, whereas those that least want
changes, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, and
probably France, are less reluctant to make concessions on CAP budgetary
reforms than on the other aspects of the policy dealing with price policy
and production targets. The member states who currently reap the benefits
from an inefficient CAP will block reforms which they perceive to be
unfavorable to their own national economic interests.
In light of the internal problems confronting the EEC, the prospect
of enlargement could put the Community's cohesion to a severe test which
it may not be able to withstand. The Commission's report to the European
Community emphasizes that for political reasons, only gradual progress is
feasible on realigning European economic policies. Enlargement of the
EEC presents an added burden on the Community and only concrete steps, by
both Spain and the member countries , will speed up the tortuously slow
pace of the negotiations.
D. CURRENT STATUS OF THE EEC
The ten heads of the EEC governments met in London during the last
week of November 1981 in an attempt to reconcile EEC differences. Disillu-
sionment with the EEC is more widespread than ever before, with many
citizens of member countries expressing a desire to leave the Community.
During 1981 and 1982, cries to leave the EEC were heard throughout
Europe. Labor unions in Great Britain, farmers in France, Socialists in
Greece, and public opinion polls in Holland and Denmark all call for
pulling their countries out of the EEC. There has also been a sharp fall
in support for the EEC in West Germany, the cornerstone of the Community.
A poll taken in April 1981 found that only 35 percent of West Germans
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were "very favorably" disposed towards the EEC. This is hardly
surprising, as West Germans perceive they are subsidising other EEC
countries, as are the British.
Just ten years ago in 1972, Willy Brandt, Edward Heath,
and Georges Pompidou created out of thin air the concept of "European
union," including monetary union, which was scheduled to be completed by
1980. To many Europeans present at its proposal, it is no surprise
that such a union has not succeeded. Observers in 1972 viewed the plan as
overly optimistic in light of the world-wide weakening of economic condi-
tions during the early 1970s. But the present mood in Europe has relegated
the concept of "European union" to an idea which seems altogether beyond
the Community's reach.
In the past ten years, the EEC's common institutions have acquired no
added authority, despite the holding of direct elections to the European
Parliament in 1979. Agreement on most of the obviously needed common
policies has proved elusive. A modest amount of progress has been made
in only one area, the development of a common foreign policy. The great
achievement of the 1960s—the creation of a Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)—as described in the preceding section, has proven to be an albatross.
Farm spending has absorbed three quarters of the EEC's money and huge
extra costs have been imposed on food-importing countries such as Britain,
Italy, and West Germany. The expectation of the early 1970s that new





social spending policies, such as the regional fund, would correct these
distortions has been belied by events.
Faced with this chronology of failure, the arguments of those who
want to abandon the European experiment seem persuasive. As stated
earlier, numerous Socialists in Britain and Greece want to pull their
countries out. Other politicians, including Helmut Schmidt, want to stay
in the EEC but seem inclined to abandon the fight for a more closely
united Europe. It is therefore important to understand why the disinte-
gration of the EEC could cut living standards throughout Western Europe,
weaken the Western Alliance, and undermine the new Mediterranean
democracies.
In regard to living standards, the EEC has succeeded in removing
tariff barriers between its members, and this has increased trade by even
more than many optimists had originally hoped. Between 1958 and 1980,
exports among the nine EEC countries (Greece was not yet a member) rose
3,000 percent in dollar terms in a period when EEC exports to the rest of
the world rose a mere 1,300 percent. ' Few tariff barriers now remain in
place, and the EEC's free-trade rules have helped to stop the world's
biggest trading block from going protectionist during the worst recession
in 50 years. It is significant that the British Labor Party rests its
arguments for leaving the EEC on its desire to establish a siege economy in
Britain. That could make Britain even poorer than it already is. If







encourage other EEC countries both to retaliate and to try a protectionist
fix for themselves, the cost of which would gradually become apparent.
A second risk is that a break-up of the EEC could undermine the
Atlantic Alliance. NATO is nearly a decade older than the EEC but
arguments about the planned installation of long-range nuclear missiles
in Europe have again stirred up neutralist sentiments. Numerous Dutchmen
and Danes are beginning to argue that they would be safer with the status
of non-aligned Austria or Sweden, without giving consideration to the
fact that the safety of Austria and Sweden rests, at least in part, on a
unified West behind them. The EEC forms part of the fiber holding
Western Europe together, and abandoning the Community could produce a
resurgence of purely nationalistic foreign policies on the continent.
Nationalism has been one of the main causes for two world wars in Europe
during the twentieth century. The EEC was created (in part) to stop
this history from repeating itself. It is a forum for settling issues
with words rather than arms and should be utilized as such. The basic
assumption of this thesis is that a correlation exists between military
security and economic development; alliance cohesion and EEC growth and
progress are essencially linked in Western Europe.
A third risk is that an EEC break-up would take the strength out of
Western Europe's stance toward the new southern democracies. A major
attraction of EEC membership for Greece, Spain, and Portugal has been
that it would make it harder for the military to usurp power. The EEC
is perceived as a democratic club, and a military coup in one of its
members would lead to that country's expulsion. Ensuring democratic
stability has been a primary motive for these new democracies to desire
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EEC integration. The Community should acknowledge responsibility in this
process by speeding the pace of accession negotiations.
E. THE BUDGET
Many Europeans feel that the costs of EEC membership are too high for
their individual countries. A more equitable budget is therefore a
prerequisite for saving the European Community. Some sources believe
that the sensible solution to the budget problem is not another palliative
as recommended by the Commission, but the introduction of a new system
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which transfers cash rrom rich states to poor states. Transfers
from one EEC country to another would thus not be the random result of
EEC spending policies designed to achieve different objectives but
would reflect a deliberate Community decision to redistribute from rich
to poor. This type of system would not be feasible without definite
limits being set as to the size of the profits or losses that one country
can make. This would create a fairer burden for West Germany and Britain
while ensuring that rich countries like France, Denmark, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and Holland made a net contribution to the EEC budget (which they
do not at the present time). Budget reform must be accompanied by
changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as discussed earlier, so
that farmers are aided by limited income subsidies instead of by artifi-
cially fixed prices for their products. If food prices were allowed to
fluctuate, to balance supply and demand, there would be no need to
accumulate surplus food.
"Why did we ever invent the EEC?" The Economist
,
London, England,
November 28, 1981, p. 12.
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F. ROADS TO EEC UNITY
If the Community budget and CAP reforms are eventually successful,
the EEC could look, to advance European integration in three ways: (a)
stronger common institutions, (b) more political cooperation, and (c)
closer economic integration. Most observers believe that stronger
common institutions are unlikely, given the current mood in Europe. The
notion of the EEC Commission as an embryo European government is not
taken seriously. Direct election of the European Parliament in 1979 was a
gesture toward stronger institutional ties but few Europeans actually
understand the workings of this Parliament or express much interest in
their elected representatives.
Greater political cooperation is viewed as a viable route to increased
EEC unity. The Ten's foreign offices have developed an efficient network
for exchanging messages daily on foreign policy issues, and the EEC
ministers and officials meet regularly. At the United Nations, the EEC
countries vote in unison on three-quarters of the issues debated, although
that is usually not too difficult. On the Arab-Israeli question, it has
been difficult to attain unity, but if one recalls that a decade ago the
views spanned a spectrum from pro-Israeli Holland to pro-Arab France, the
EEC has come a long way. The Community's common trade policy has enabled
it to use economic clout for political ends such as opening its markets to
poor countries and imposing sanctions on Iran. West Germany's foreign
minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has even suggested that the EEC form a








The obstacles to European defense union appear to outweigh the
positive arguments. Proponents suggest that a Community defense policy
would (a) divert the tendency toward neutralism in the smaller EEC
countries; (b) provide a defense forum for France; and (c) tend to
rationalize and restructure Europe's overlapping arms industry. Those
opposed to the plan argue that (a) there is not a perfect overlap of NATO
and the EEC in that Ireland is in the EEC but not in NATO, while Norway,
Turkey, and Iceland belong to NATO but not to the EEC; (b) any move to
create a European defense community independent of the United States
might encourage neo-isolationists in America to pull American troops out
of Europe; and (c) future European defense decisions could be subject to
a member country's veto; and due to the diversity of views within the
European Community, this would probably ensure a "no-action" defense
policy. Pursuit of an implausible consensus within the EEC has been the
cause of many controversies, and the idea of a common EEC defense policy
is unlikely to gain much support in the current European political
climate.
The third road to greater unity, closer economic integration, is the
most promising. Enlargement of the Community has necessitated a critical
look at EEC goals and failures. The Community is still a long way from
achieving the total common market goals it is aiming at. Prices of cars,
one of the most tradeable consumer goods, still vary by as much as 50
percent from one EEC country to another. This type of variation is
possible because the ten countries still have widely different rules on
such things as safety and pollution. Harmonization of these rules will
help to create a genuine common market, with fewer restrictions and more
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competition. The proposed enlargement of the EEC has spear-headed
action for reform which has been lagging for years. Economic integration
is a complex notion and what Europe needs now is not grand declarations
but a determination to put its spending in order and to create a really
competitive market, which might open the way for closer political and
monetary union in the 1990s.
Spain's dual foreign policy goals of joining NATO and the EEC are intri-
cately linked by an overwhelming desire to join Europe. Spanish membership
in NATO is expected to be accomplished by May 1982. Spain will become a
member of the EEC by 1985. Most sources maintain that the original 1983/1984
integration date was overly optimistic and the complex EEC enlargement prob-
lems have only recently been understood in Madrid. Spanish membership in NATO
could serve Co accelerate the EEC integration process, but internal Spanish
economic reform is needed for smooth integration into the European Community.
The prospect of EEC enlargement and the British budget dispute have
forced the European Community governments to examine their partnership,
recognize its flaws, and face the long-avoided propsect of reform as an
alternative Co the possible dissolution of the EEC. Internal and external
pressures confront the Community durint the 1980s. It is essential that
the EEC members iron out their problems in a mutually beneficial manner.
Patching over differences to postpone possible confrontations will not
suffice or add Co EEC uniCy ^ A future EEC composed of twelve states,
each with its own aspirations, capabilities, and interests will have to
carefully consider and judiciously apply new mechanisms to increase
European cooperation.





IX. SPAIN SEEKS NATO MEMBERSHIP
A. THE NATO DEBATE
On August 20, 1981, Don Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the Spanish Prime
Minister, formally announced that Spain would seek NATO membership. This
declaration was anticipated in international circles but the timing
of Spain's decision did catch some foreign observers off-guard. Since
May 1981, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff negotiating team has
been actively pursuing a renewal of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between Spain and the U.S. (often referred to as the base
rights agreement), and the NATO admission of Spain could considerably
alter the scope of this treaty and the tone of the negotiations. The
1976 agreement was due to expire on September 21, 1981, but it was
decided to extend the agreement for eight months. During this period, it
is expected that NATO membership will be attained by Spain, thus requiring
a conscientious rethinking of what should be included in the U.S. -Spain
bilateral accord. The negotiations are still being pursued with particular
heed being given to the changing political and military realities in Spain.
The Cabinet decision to apply for full NATO membership can be viewed
as tne culmination of a thirty-seven year commitment of Spain to take her
rightful place in European security affairs. During the "fascist" regime
of General Francisco Franco, Spain was essentially isolated and ostracized
from the mainstream of the continent due to European distaste for Franco's
dictatorial form of government and its origins in the Spanish Civil War.
At the NATO Conference in May 1970, the northern European nations soundly
overruled Spanish admission to the Alliance, adhering to their traditional
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position that democracy in Spain was a prerequisite to membership. The
death of General Franco on November 20, 1975, and the subsequent approval
in December 1978 of a 169-article Constitution were key events that helped
to propel the nation toward European integration. The dual objectives of
NATO and EEC membership have been the cornerstones of Spain's foreign
policy, but domestic turmoil has complicated the attainment of these goals.
Terrorism and the after-effects of an abortive coup d'etat attempt (in
February 1981) continue to test the young democracy. An internal debate
rages between the four principal political parties as to the value of
NATO membership to Spain. During the fall of 1981, the Socialist party
(PSOE) with aid from the Communist Party (PCE) launched a major anti-NATO
campaign throughout Spain. The streets of Madrid were littered with
anti-NATO literature, and a public drive took place in an attempt to
obtain 500,000 signatures to call for a popular referendum on the NATO
issue. The forces backing NATO entry, principally the governing centrist
party—the UCD (Union del Centro Democratico)—and the CD (Coalicion
Democratico, formally known as the AP or Alianza Popular), have not been
successful with the public at large in countering the anti-NATO campaign,
as mentioned earlier. The pro-NATO political forces possessed enough
parliamentary votes to pass the issue in the Spanish legislature without
a referendum.
Even though the anti-NATO campaign presented problems for the governing
UCD, on November 26, 1981 the Spanish Senate voted 106 to 66 to accept a
NATO membership invitation. An accession protocol was signed on December 10,
1981 in Brussels at a special meeting of NATO Council Ministers. This
protocol's ratification by the 15 Alliance members will authorize
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Spanish accession to NATO. Most observers believe the target date
of May 1982 for Spanish accession will be met, banning major political
obstacles.
The debate in Spain centers on whether the country would benefit
more from (a) full-fledged membership in the Western community, including
NATO and the EEC, or (b) a more neutral posture, between the West and the
Soviet bloc, and with a special relationship with the oil-producing Arab
countries. The Soviet Union has persistently warned Spain that it
would regard Spain's adhesion to NATO as a fundamental realignment of the
East-West balance that would put Spain on the front-line of any war in
Europe. The Soviets have also dropped subtle hints implying that, if
Spain stayed out of the alliance, the Soviet Union would use its influ-
ence to help eliminate Basque terrorism. The pro-NATO forces point out
that because of Spain's bilateral treaty with the United States, it would
be difficult for Spain to maintain neutrality in an East-West conflict,
while NATO membership would commit other alliance members to the defense
of Spain. NATO membership could also assist the Spanish effort against
terrorism by promoting increased international collaboration in law
enforcement. Though a number of other pros and cons regarding NATO
membership are discussed in Spain, Western observers agree that the
advantages for both Spain and NATO outweigh the disadvantages.
B. SPANISH PRIORITIES: NATO, GIBRALTAR, EEC
During a recent visit to Europe researching the implications of
Spanish political priorities, it was the privilege of this author to
interview the Spanish Ambassador to Belgium, Sehor Don Nuho Aguirre de
Career. His Excellency warmly recalled an informal reunion which took.
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place in 1969 between himself and the famous University of Chicago
professor of international relations Hans Morgenthau. During their
meeting, the future Ambassador boldly asserted that it was his sincere
desire to help navigate Spain into the twentieth century by simultan-
eously solving three problems: entry into NATO, entry into the EEC,
and Gibraltar. The reaction of the scholar of international relations
was to label these goals the dreams of a daring young diplomat. Today,
the realization of the Ambassador's past vision seems close at hand for
Spain.
The solution to Gibraltar could lie beneath a NATO umbrella.
Spain will have to unlock the gates to the Rock, and come to an agreement
with the United Kingdom over its future status. Gibraltar has often been
referred to as a splinter in the heart of Spain, and removal of this
source of irritation would allow the Spanish to concentrate on the other
international problems facing them. Although Gibraltar is an emotional
issue for the Spanish, it need not be an insurmountable obstacle blocking
Spanish entry into NATO. The forthcoming membership of Spain in the
Alliance has provided a framework for progress on the issue of Gibraltar.
Possible creation of a Spanish NATO Command at Cartagena or Cadiz, which
the Spanish press has discussed, could logically lead to coordination
with Gibraltar, which now reports to the NATO Headquarters in Naples.
The ancient and emotional diplomatic dispute is clearly between Great
Britain and Spain to resolve but being NATO partners may hasten a
breakthrough on the problem.
The on-going EEC negotiations are extremely complex, but progress has
been made since the 1977 Spanish application for membership. Internal
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EEC policies are current ly being reformed and revamped to ease the pains
of enlargement. The EEC's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and budget are
both scheduled for lengthy revision, as discussed earlier. Spain also
must make some internal adjustments in her economic sector, such as
changing her taxation policies and modernizing industrial practices, in
order to become a member of the EEC. Owing to the technical nature of
these negotiations, progress has been slow; but most observers believe
that Spanish EEC membership may be attained within the next three years.
NATO is essentially the military infrastructure of the Community,
and Spain's desire to enter both the EEC and NATO has been a constant
priority.
C. ROLE OF THE SPANISH MILITARY IN NATO
Progress in modernization of the Spanish military forces has been
steady since the mid-1970' s. The relationship between the Spanish
military and foreign policy had to be reassessed after Franco's death.
Spain's military traditions had to be democratized, while equipment and
procedures had to be technically brought up to date in order to coordinate
Spanish security interests with Spanish foreign policy. Speculation
continues regarding the specific role of the Spanish military within a
NATO environment, but one point is clear. The additional number of
troops, usually estimated at 3<+2,000, will increase NATO's force
strength.
An array of organizational decisions will face NATO upon Spanish
entry. Most sources agree that the Spanish Navy and Air Force are more
readily adaptable to the NATO structure than the Spanish army. This has
been reflected in the shifting distribution of the Spanish defense budget
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within the last few years, which has favored the Navy and Air Force. A
Ministry of Defense was formed at the end of 1977 to attempt coordination
between the services. The recent Military Retirement Law, passed July
11, 1981, could also have long-term, far-reaching effects in realigning
the hierarchy of the Spanish Armed Forces. The government has been subtly
trying to restructure the military for a new NATO role; but it will take
time for the forces to switch from an internal security role to a national
defense role aimed at external adversaries.
During a recent interview in the magazine NATO's Fifteen Nations
,
the Spanish Defense Minister, Alberto Oliart Saussol, pointed out that
"Spain belongs to the West ideologically and economically,
and is clearly allied with it. It is anticipated that in the near
future this alliance will be even more concrete than it is today.
The security of Western Europe, which is seriously threatened by the
problems in~the Middle and Near East, depends upon the NATOnit / jlance.
As to the military advantages of NATO entry, the Defense Minister
stressed the participation by Spanish armed forces in a wider sphere
which would allow access to and comparison of doctrines, procedures,
information, weapons and material, training, and logistic possibilities,
all of which would make the Spanish armed forces more effective. The
desire to enter NATO to upgrade and modernize the Spanish armed forces
is related to an interest in increasing Spanish arms exports. Such





June-July 1981, Vol. 26, No. 3, "Defense
Problems of Spain," interview with Alberto Oliart Saussol, Minister of
Defense.

D. MOSCOW'S VIEW OF SPAIN IN NATO
Minimizing Spain's contribution to the alliance — or trying to
prevent it altogether — forms part of the Soviet process of outflanking
NATO, both militarily and economically. The Soviets understand how Spain
might strengthen Western security and seek to prevent her contribution.
This Soviet desire to neutralize the potential accession of Spain to NATO
was evident in the 1976 Soviet proposal that both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact agree not to expand. Spain's PCE echoed this line, and the PSOE
Socialists led by Felipe Gonzales were hostile to both NATO membership
and the bilateral link with the United States.
In early September 1981, the Soviet Union delivered an official
warning to Spain, stating that NATO entry would increase international
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tensions. Spain's reply to the Soviet memorandum was to call it a rude
intervention into internal Spanish politics, essentially dismissing
the warning. Relations have been strained between the two countries for
the past several months, especially since the Spanish government expelled
some Soviet embassy personnel accused of spying during the fall of 1981.
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Alberto Ballarin, "El memorandum Sovietico," Ya (newspaper)
Madrid, Spain, September 12, 1981, p. 5.
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X. SPANISH MILITARY REFORM
A. SPANISH ARMED FORCES
The total number of armed forces in Spain is 342,000 (230,000 con-
scripts). The estimates for each service are as follows:
Army: 255,000 (190,000 conscripts)
Navy: 49,000 (12,500 Marines)
40,000 conscripts
Air Force: 38,000
Reserves (all services): 1,085,000
Para Military Forces
:
Guardia de Civil 64,000
Policia Armada 40,000
Military service is compulsory and the length of conscription is
15 months. The force allocation by percentages is: Army 76 percent,
Navy 13 percent, and Air Force 11 percent.
These figures are provided as a basis for a discussion of military
reforms undertaken in Spain.
The traditional mission of the Navy is to provide defense of the
coastal waters of Spain, the Balearic and Canary Islands, and overseas
"The Military Balance 1980/81," compiled by International Institute
for Strategic Studies, London, Bartholemew Press, 1980, p. 36.
"El Coste Economico de La Defensa," chapter by Angel Lobo in
Espana-ijue Defensa
,




possessions, in addition to protection for Spanish shipping. It is
also responsible for coast guard functions, such as prevention of smuggl-
ing and the patrol of territorial fishing waters. Supporting tasks
include ASW, mine warfare, and amphibious operations.
Current estimates of Spanish naval forces are 49,000, which includes
12,500 marines. This small but thoroughly dedicated force has been
gradually modernized. Much of the equipment used by the Spanish Navy in
the past was second-hand and of American manufacture, but recent trends
have been toward new equipment of Spanish construction. The Spanish Navy
shipyard, Bazan, plans to launch the aircraft carrier P. A. -11 of 15,000-
ton displacement during the Spring of 1982. The P. A. -11 will be the
first aircraft carrier ever constructed in Spanish shipyards, and it will
allow the so-called sky-jump which permits takeoff of the Harrier-Matador
aircraft ordered by the Spanish Navy. Four new French Agosta submarines
and four frigates are also on order. The transition from a coastal
patrol force to a modern NATO naval force could produce intense growth
for the Spanish Navy in the next few years.
The Spanish naval officer, who travels with his service, is more
likely to speak a foreign language than his army or air force counterparts
Spanish warships at sea communicate tactically in English, as do NATO
navies due to extensive experience during exercises with both NATO and
U.S. fleets. The Spanish Navy appears to be overwhelmingly in support of
NATO entry, which would widen the scope of the Navy's mission. Wide
speculation exists in Spain that NATO membership could possibly involve a
straits command being set up with a Spanish admiral in charge. Until
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negotiations between NATO and Spain begin to discuss actual force roles,
such speculations are tentative.
B. MILITARY REORGANIZATION
All military reforms are being conducted under a program called
"Ciclo de la Politica de Defensa" (Cycle of the Defense Policy). The
Minister of Defense establishes the guidelines around which the military
and non-military defense power of Spain are to be organized. Under these
policies, three objectives are to be sought by three different agencies:
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare and propose the joint strategic
plan.
2. Civilian ministers elaborate partial contributory plans to the
common defense effort.
3. The General Secretariat of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of
Defense establishes the high level logistics plan.
Not all of the agencies participating in the "cycle" have produced
the expected results. The joint strategic plan has been completed, but
the other two aspects of the "cycle" are lagging behind. The civilian
ministries have not produced even a partial plan and the high-level
logistics plan is hampered by inter-service reservations and lack, of
sufficient political leverage resulting from the fact that the Minister
of Defense is the only civilian serving in an executive capacity in his
own ministry. He is therefore forced to rely on military personnel who
are affected by the military reform and the reorganization of the
structures of the different services.
The industrial sector was also programmed to be a driving force in
the reform process. Under the responsibility of the Direccion General de
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Armamento y Material (Arms and Material Division), the defense industries
in Spain were supposed to contribute to the military reform. Reasons for
failure in the industrial sector are twofold: (1) isolation of the
defense industry from updated management techniques for planning purposes,
and (2) resistance of the defense industries to be drawn into a common
restructuring process. Many observers believe that the government
should be exerting more pressure on the different agencies to proceed
with the planned reforms.
Spain spends approximately $125 per capita on defense, a figure
comparable to that of Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and Luxembourg.
Modernization is a costly process ; personnel expenditure in the armed
forces is being reduced in favor of investment (62 percent of the defense
budget in 1975 to 55 percent in 1980). Each service has adopted a
program for combat readiness; but without a well-developed defense plan,
Spain's coordinated effort at reform could fail. The Navy plans to
continue to form its combat group around its light carrier; the air force
is about to get a new generation of aircraft; and the army intends to
enlarge each of its three major formations (the armored, mechanized, and
motorized divisions) by one new brigade. But none of these technological
modernizations will obviate the need for true structural reform in the
Spanish armed forces.
Antonio Sanchez-Gi jon, a leading Spanish defense writer, sums up

















"The Spanish government approaches the NATO decision while many
of the contemplated military reforms are still underway or not
yet envisaged. It also lacks a well-defined defense policy. Up
to now Spanish military and defensive thought has traditionally
revolved around the idea of exclusively defending Spanish territory
and sovereignty; thus, joining the alliance obliges government and
military planners to think, in terms of defense in the context of a
coalition war. The level of professional defense debate in Spain
seems inadequate and outmoded . It must be taken into account,
however, that as a result of the coup attempt and the tensions
created by acts of terrorism perpetrated against high-ranking army
officers, the political climate has been totally unfavorable to any
intellectual exchange in matters of defense planning and military
organization.
C. SPANISH DEFENSE IDEAS
Often referred to as the "threat from the South," Spanish defense
planning has been essentially geared to thwart an attack from North
Africa. This North African threat syndrome is closely related to
past Spanish historical experiences and has been fed by the realities of
an unstable Maghreb. Traditional Spanish security interests of the
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan Mediterranean coasts
obviously relate to the North African threat. The recent build-up of
Soviet armaments in Libya and Colonel Qaddafi's aggressive behavior in
the Mediterranean have made the threat seem niore credible to Spanish
authorities. The growth of Moroccan airpower and Algerian sea-borne
missile capacity is of great concern to those who imagine that an adver-
sary to the south may attack Spain. The consequences of Spanish entry
into NATO could be to reduce the perceived danger from Northern Africa to
Spain. In a new political role as a member of NATO, a strong possibility
NATO's Fifteen Nations
, June-July 1981, Vol. 26, No. 3; "Spain on




exists for Spain to practice balance of power policies in the Maghreb.
Spanish officials presumably realize that it is in the interest of all
the Western allies to maintain stability in this geostrategic area.
As Spanish strategists and military planners prepare to join NATO,
there must be a change in focus from the traditional Spanish security
concepts to include a wider range of possibilities for defense. The
"Baleares-Gibraltar Straits-Canaries axis" security area should be
widened to include other aspects of Spain's strategic environment.
Antonio Sanchez-Gi jon has drawn up a list of strategic possibilities for
Spanish planners to assess in redefining their defense role within the
Alliance. These include:
1. A view of the Iberian Peninsula as a bastion in the rear of Europe
—
a platform for the projection of power.
2. The capacity to project armed power from the Iberian Peninsula is
based on secure access to its coasts by the cargoes that use the
South Atlantic and South Central American sea and air routes. The
Peninsula is a traditional beachhead for armies fighting for
supremacy in Europe. It is protected by distance from Soviet
attack, by conventional means.
3. Spain has a vital interest in supporting the strength of the
European Central and Southern flanks of the Alliance; she has a
direct interest in the maintenance of stability in the Maghreb
area, especially in relation Co the Canaries.
4. Both Spain and the allies are interested in the control of the
Straits of Gibraltar, and in the control of the opposite shores by
a friendly country, Morocco. Ceuta and Melilla can be turned into
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a token of Moroccan stability, and the British colony of Gibraltar
79
into a symbol of Western security and cooperation.
One can readily see that the organization of Spain's defense can
no longer be planned in terms of one (North African) threat to her
territory. It is in the vital interest of Spanish strategic planners
to widen the scope of their security concerns. NATO alliance would
facilitate this task and assist Spanish military officials in future





p. 47. (Antonio Sanchez-Gi jon's article in NATO'S Fifteen
Nations
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XI. THE COMBINED MILITARY COORDINATION AND
PLANNING STAFF (CMCPS)
A. CONCEPT
Under the terms of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
between the United States and Spain, the Combined Military Coordination
and Planning Staff was established. The mission of the CMCPS was to
facilitate coordination between the Spanish Armed Forces and the Armed
Forces of the United States, as well as other forces dedicated to the
defense of the North Atlantic.
The CMCPS is responsible for preparing and coordinating plans which
are in harmony with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic
area, and for actions which could be taken within the geographic area of
common interest (ACI). Many observers believe that the work of the
CMCPS has been instrumental in preparing the Spanish Armed Forces for an
eventual NATO role. The infrastructure created in 1976 could be used as
a starting point for eventual integration of Spanish forces into the NATO
organizational structure. The CMCPS headquarters has also been the site
of the U.S. -Spanish bilateral negotiations in Madrid. During a recent
trip to Madrid, this author conducted interviews with members of the
CMCPS in relation to Spanish entrance into NATO. Most observers noted
that, if Spain joins NATO as planned, the CMCPS could play a very important
role. The ongoing projects of defense planning, logistics, and equipment




Under Supplementary Agreement Number 5 of the Treaty, the Spanish-
American Council was set up and it is under this Council that the CMCPS
works. Planning is done by permanent military representatives to the
staff from the U.S. and Spanish military. Areas covered by the CMCPS
include
:
1. Maritime defense of the geographic area of common interest (ACI);
2. Air and ground defense of Spain;
3. Force readiness;
4. ACI Command Structure; and
5. Spanish contribution to the defense of the West.
The military committee has formulated the proposal to appoint a
commander-in-chief, ACI to head the combined strategic structure and the
staff has also formulated an ACI general defense plan and alert procedures
plan. These proposals or plans will have to be reviewed and revised if
Spain joins the Alliance but many of the concepts which have been agreed
upon since 1976 could be enlarged to facilitate Spanish force coordination
within NATO.
The organization of the CMCPS consists of a General Secretariat;
four Coordination and Planning Divisions (Operations, Intelligence,
Logistics and Communications); and an Exercise Division. All the divisions
are manned by Spanish and U.S. military personnel of equivalent ranks.
Militarily, the Combined Staff is responsible to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Spanish Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Military
Committee. The structure resembles in many ways the system established
in SHAPE, only on a smaller bi -lateral scale. During a visit to the
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CHOPS in October 1981, the atmosphere was very cordial, with Spanish and
American military officers working side-by-side on joint projects. A
speculative mood existed as to the new roles members of the CMCPS might
have as Spain joined NATO; but all believed the structure of the Staff had
effectively prepared Spanish military officers for an international role.
One of the most significant achievements of the Staff since 1976 has been
the role of the Exercise Division which prepares and coordinates a
Combined Annual Exercise Plan. These annual exercises have been instru-
mental in preparing the Spanish Armed Forces for a role within NATO. The
Spanish Navy and Air Force have been the chief beneficiaries of these
combined exercises due to the composition of U.S. armed forces in the
Mediterranean area (i.e., mainly U.S. Navy and Air Force).
The CMCPS is related to other headquarters in that USCINCEUR is
the principal U.S. coordinating authority and the Spanish officer
assigned as President of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Chief of the
High General Staff) is the principal Spanish coordinating authority. As
is evident, the infrastructure of the CMCPS could be used in the transition
of the Spanish armed forces into a NATO environment.
C. GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF COMMON INTEREST (ACI)
In order to clearly view the geostrategic perspective of the CMCPS,
a definition of the ACI is appropriate. The geographic area of common
interest is defined as follows:
1. Spain, including adjacent airspace
2. Atlantic Area




b. Western limit: from the intersection of 48 degrees north
lattitude and 23 degrees west longitude, south to the parallel
of 23 degrees north latitude
c. Southern limit: the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude
eastward from 23 degrees west longitude to the coastal waters
of the African littoral
d. Eastern limit: northward along the African coast to the Strait
of Gibraltar, and thence northward along the coast of Europe to
38 degrees north latitude
3. Mediterranean Area: from the Strait of Gibraltar to the meridian
of 7 degrees east longitude
4. The ACI excludes the territory of third states and their territorial
waters
5. The ACI encompasses portions of the areas assigned to two U.S.
unified commands, the Atlantic Command and the European Command.
For the Atlantic area, all phases of plan development and operations
shall be a matter of coordination with the Commander-in-Chief,
Atlantic (C1NCLANT) through U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe
(USCINCEUR) , and subject to such agreements as may be deemed
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necessary.
A map is included following this description of the ACI for
information. The map is an approximation of the terms of the ACI.
80
Terms of Reference for the Combined Staff (Revised 18 April 1980,












































Spain's geostrategic significance to the Alliance derives in part
from its dominant geographic position with respect to adjoining seas and
sea passages and from its natural barriers to invasion. Its seaports and
airfields command the eastern Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar.
The significance of such a favored strategic position is greatly increased
by Spain's considerable distance from the airfields of the Warsaw Pact
countries and its natural barriers to an invasion.
Unlike France, which also has a position on both the Atlantic and
Mediterranean, formidable mountain ranges shield Spain from invasion by land,
In the north, the Pyrenees block the overland route from Europe. Moreover,
invading Warsaw Pact ground forces would have to pass through both
Germany and France before confronting the Pyrenees. If invading forces
chose the amphibious route, they would encounter other mountains whether
they made their assaults from the Atlantic, the Balearic, or the Alboran
Seas, for in the northeast and east, the Catalonian Mountains stand
inland from a narrow coastal plain, and in the south and southeast, the
Andulusians complete the chain of mountains that enclose three sides of
Spain's tableland. Only from the west, through Portugal, is Spain easily
accessible to invading ground forces.
Air distances from eastern Europe to central Spain are 2,000 miles
or more, and central Spain is several hundred miles beyond all but a
few French airfields. Moreover, penetration of Spanish airspace would
require Warsaw Pact aircraft to pass through or suppress the NATO air
defenses beginning in the Federal Republic of Germany or Italy.
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A Spanish stronghold could thus serve NATO as a staging point or a
base for naval and military operations into the waterways bordering the
European Peninsula, into the westward reaches of the Atlantic, into the
land mass of Europe itself, or even into North Africa. Should retreat
operations be necessary, Spain can be made a stronghold in whose expanse
of land and in whose numerous ports and airfields refuge could be found
to regroup and to rebuild offensive strength. As Curt Gasteyger notes,
The Southern flank, has been the 'neglected child' of the alliance
for too long. As Western security in the broadest sense depends ever
more on events outside the alliance, particularly in the Middle East,
the defense and stability of the southern flank, as the link between
the two, are crucial to the alliance.
8 1
Curt Gasteyger, "The Southern Flank: New Dimensions" in NATO:
The Next Thirty Years , edited by Kenneth A. Myers, Westview Press,
Colorado, 1980, p. 187.
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XII. UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN SPAIN
The United States has a wide variety of political, economic and
security interests in its relations with Spain. Since Franco's death,
the U.S. has fully supported the democratic evolution in Spain. Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations alike maintained close ties
with the Franco regime for thirty years, justifying the relationship with
a rightist authoritarian regime in ant i -Communist and strategic terms.
This support coexisted uneasily with the U.S. commitment to democracy,
and the close ties to Franco's regime were a source of tension within the
American political system and in U.S. foreign policy. Frictions were
created with other democratic states, particularly among the northern
European nations, which were not convinced that the strategic importance
of Spain outweighed the lack of democracy there.
Since 1976, Spain has radically changed its form of government. This
transition to democracy has made Spanish membership in the economic and
defense alliances of Western Europe a clear possibility. Democratic
progress in Spain is in the U.S. national interest. Spanish membership
in the EEC and NATO is also concurrent with U.S. economic and security
interests on the Iberian Peninsula. One problem which may face the U.S.
as change occurs in Spain is that democratic Spain may prove to be a
somewhat less predictable ally than the Spain led by General Franco.
82
Issues in United States Relations with Spain and Portugal
,
Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 1979, Washington, D.C., p. 4.
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Bilateral problems may emerge between the U.S. and Spain. U.S. interests
will nonetheless be better served by support for democracy in Spain.
A. U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Spain, while not yet enjoying a standard of living comparable to most
other Western industrial countries, nonetheless qualifies as one of the
83
top ten industrialized countries in the world. It therefore consti-
tutes an important economy in terms of its potential for future absorption
of U.S. and other imports, and it is likely to become a more active
exporter as its industries adjust to competition in the European Community.
Spain may also present an increasingly attractive market for financial
investments from the U.S. The United States, therefore, has significant
economic interests in the policies and performance of the Spanish economy.
The American Embassy in Madrid judges Spain to be one of the principal
84
markets for American exports. In 1977, Spain imported approximately
S2,162 million worth of American goods. Agricultural products constituted
the largest share, with approximately $330 million in oilseeds (primarily
8 5
soybeans) and $215 million in corn. Other imports included (in
descending order of value) coal, organic chemicals, tobacco, data process-
ing equipment, iron and steel scrap, and machinery. These imports
constituted approximately 12 percent of all Spanish imports, compared to
approximately 34 percent coming from the European Community countries.
83OECD Economic Surveys, Spain
, April 1980, OECD, Director of
Information, Paris, France, p. 50.
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prepared by American Embassy, Madrid, July 1978,
p. 4.
85 Ibid., p. 6.
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Spain has traditionally run a deficit in its balance of trade with
the U.S. In 1977, this deficit amounted to approximately $1,160 million,
as Spain exported approximately $1,000 million to the U.S. Spain exports
no significant quantities of vital raw materials or mineral resources to
the U.S. Footwear led the list of Spanish exports to the U.S. in 1977
with approximately $230 million in value, followed by canned vegetables,
petroleum products, tires, iron and steel plate, books, motor vehicle
parts, and olive oil. These exports amounted to about ten percent of all
Spanish exports, compared to 46 percent going to the European Community
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members.
With regard to future trade, the American Embassy in Madrid has judged
that, in addition to stable demand for American agricultural products,
there will be potential for growth in exports of equipment for health
care, electrical power, computerization, and process control. The 1978
Embassy report has also projected possible opportunities for increased
U.S. export of building and construction equipment, research and instruc-
tion equipment, on and offshore drilling equipment, coal mining equipment,
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and laboratory and scientific instruments.
The extent of such growth will depend heavily on whether the Spanish
economy can sustain real growth while combating serious inflation (15.7
percent), high unemployment (10.2 percent), and persistent balance of
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economic problems will in turn be affected by whatever political turmoil
and domestic uncertainties take place as Spain becomes firmly entrenched
in Europe through NATO and EEC membership.
Spain's entry to the European Community may have some marginal
negative impact on U.S. exports to Spain, but this may be more than
offset by certain positive impacts. The process of adapting to European
Community rules and tariff structures will occur throughout the 1980s.
While producers in the European Community countries will eventually enjoy
tariff -free entry into the Spanish market, the European Community countries
are not significant competitors in the principal areas of current U.S.
exports to Spain. In addition, U.S. exports to Spain of many manufactured
products might benefit from the fact that Spain's overall tariff structure,
after joining the EEC, will make the market somewhat more vulnerable to
to U.S. imports than it is at present. Sales to EEC markets by U.S.
multinationals operating in Spain may also benefit.
In Spain, U.S. investments are larger than those of any other single
foreign country. Current trends seem to be preserving this position,
although West Germany, with its growing resources, is now an active
investor in Spain. During the first quarter of 1978, the U.S. accounted
for 32 percent of all foreign investment, West Germany for 26 percent,
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and Switzerland for 15 percent. Spain continues to require new
investment, particularly to modernize plant and equipment and to restruc-
ture industry to prepare for the time when the Spanish market will be
opened to direct competition with the efficient industries of the
89
The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., Quarterly Economic Review
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,
3rd Quarter 1978, London, p. 14.
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European Community countries. The Spanish government has continued to
take a relatively open attitude toward foreign investment, liberalizing
banking laws in 1978 to permit foreign banks to open branches in Spain.
There has been some concern expressed, particulary by the Socialists,
that certain sectors of the economy are becoming excessively dominated
90
by foreign capital. Spain's investment requirements appear to
guarantee significant investment opportunities, provided that the country
remains on a democratic course and that EEC accession negotiations proceed
without major setbacks. United States national economic interests
can best be served by a closer association of Spain with the other
democracies of Western Europe. The U.S. has supported Spanish initiatives
to join the EEC; but, due to the complex nature of the negotiations, the
United States cannot substantially affect the timetable for Spanish
accession to the European Community. Pressure from the U.S. on the
European Community countries to speed up the entry procedures would be
detrimental to Spain. The United States has tried to persuade the
Western European countries that an institutional overlap exists between
NATO, the EEC, and the OECD, and that national security interests are
91inexorably linked to national economic interests.
B. U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS
The foreign and defense policy of Spain is of considerable importance
to U.S. strategic interests. If the West could depend on a Spanish
90
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contribution to Western defense in the case of an East-West confrontation
in Europe, the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance would look, more favorable with
the addition of 342,000 Spanish forces. Even more important than Spanish
manpower and arms would be the benefits flowing from the inclusion of
Spanish territory in the NATO area. NATO would gain added territorial
depth for defense and would benefit from more flexible and dependable
lines of logistics support and communications. The geostrategic impor-
tance of Spain to NATO is quite obvious and the U.S. has long recognized
the importance of Spain to U.S. national security goals. Since 1953,
there has been a bilateral accord between Spain and the U.S. This accord
has provided the U.S. with access to and use of certain Spanish military
facilities and installations. This defense relationship is incorporated
in the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the U.S. and
Spain. The Treaty was to expire in Septemaber 1981 but has been extended
until May 1982. The United States is actively supporting the Spanish
application to join NATO, but overt political pressure by the U.S. on
other Alliance members would probably be counterproductive. Spanish
accession to NATO is expected to be accomplished by May 1982, but
irrespective of the NATO decision, the U.S. has specific strategic
interests in Spain.
The principle Spanish facilities presently utilized by the United
States are the naval base complex at Rota; Torre jon, Zaragoza, and Moron
Air Bases; the 3ardenas Reales Firing Range; and the Cadiz-Zaragoza
pipeline. (Refer to Map on page 94.) In addition, a number of other
communications and support facilities are made available for the use
of American military forces.
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Foremost among the U.S. installations is the Rota Naval Base complex
near Cadiz. Until 1979, Rota was the home port for a tender that served
the U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Under
92Supplementary Agreement No. 6 of the Treaty, the U.S. agreed to
withdraw by July 1, 1979 the nuclear submarine force which used the Rota
tender. Anti-nuclear political pressure, supported by the Spanish
Socialists and Communists, forced the removal of the U.S. nuclear sub-
marines from Spain. Rota continues to support the U.S. Navy's airborne
anti-submarine warfare (ASW-P-3s) and ocean surveillance operations. The
ASW aircraft staging out of Rota are in a geographically superb position
to cover the approaches to Gibralter and the Western Mediterranean area.
Torre jon Air Base, located just east of Madrid, serves as headquar-
ters for a tactical fighter wing that could have a strike mission in the
event of war. Torre jon also serves as a major staging, reinforcement,
and logistic airlift base for U.S. forces. Zaragoza Air Base in northeast
Spain is used as a tactical fighter training base. It is situated near
the Bardenas Reales Firing Range where gunnery and bombing practice for
the units of the U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE) takes place. Approxi-
mately 70 percent of the air-to-ground and 50 percent of the air-to-air
weapons training of the USAFE takes place at Zaragoza and its associated
facilities.
Moron Air Base, located near Seville, is a support and communications
base that is currently in standby status. The 468-mile Cadiz-Zaragoza
92Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and U.S
—
Supplementary Agreement 6, Paragraph 1, Madrid, 1976.
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pipeline provides a vital means of conveyance for aviation fuel, motor
gasoline, and diesel fuel for operations of the U.S. forces in Spain.
As is evident, the net contribution of military missions supported
Dy these facilities to both the United States and NATO security interests
is considerable. Replacing some of these installations by relocation
would be difficult and would degrade the ability of the U.S. to fulfill
important military missions. Under current agreements, the Spanish base
facilities would be available in the event of a war, but activities at
the bases are subject to Spanish approval and continued access would be
more secure if Spain were a member of NATO.
The relationship between renewal of the terms under which the U.S. is
provided access to the Spanish base facilities and Spain's membership in
NATO contains some very difficult questions of timing and substance.
From the U.S. perspective, some might argue that if Spain becomes a
member of NATO, it would no longer be appropriate to have to pay for
access to facilities that essentially support objectives of the Alliance.
From the Spanish perspective, the advantages of joining NATO could have
been diminished by the prospect of losing the financial benefits inherent
in the bilateral accord. Neither of these arguments seems to be ultimately
persuasive. Spain has requested NATO membership and the U.S. Treaty has
been extended until May 1982. An enlightened and well-organized U.S.
political and diplomatic effort will be needed to sustain vital U.S. and
NATO security interests on the Iberian Peninsula. The effort, however,





Over Che past few years, Spain's new democracy led by King Juan
Carlos has continued to consolidate itself internally for the goals of
joining the European Community and NATO. Half -in half -out memberships
are no longer seen as viable for the Spanish economy. All forces within
the country seem to be united behind the EEC issue. Spain's eventual
entry to the EEC is backed by all political parties, and sometimes even
taken for granted by the public at large. The NATO membership issue is
much more controversial, but of the utmost importance to the Spanish
government.
After decades of Francoist-imposed isolation, saturated with memories
of the long-dead glories of the Spanish past, Spaniards want to join in a
common European destiny. They also want to consolidate the democratization
that has been achieved by joining the European democratic club. Many of
the decisions that affect Spain are made in Brussels; and the Spanish
want to have a voice in Brussels, speaking for the Spanish interests.
At the present time, there are no major internal political obstacles
to Spanish entry to the EEC. The opposition of certain agricultural
interests in France and Italy is much less likely to be decisive than the
pressures on the EEC to help a newly democratic nation prosper. A number
of critical issues remain to be settled; but progress since 1977 has been
steady and by 1985 Spain will probably be granted full membership in
the European Economic Community.
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The NATO membership issue is more difficult, but Spain may become a
member of NATO during the first half of 1982. The negotiations between
NATO and the Spanish government will have to resolve delicate political
and technical issues, including:
1. The role of the Spain in the NATO infrastructure, share of the
administrative budget, staffing, and respresentation on civilian
and military agencies
.
2. The question of where Spain will fit in the present NATO command
structure. Spain has both Atlantic and Mediterranean interests.
How will these be strategically most advantageously divided?
Will Spain fall under SACEUR or SACLANT or both?
3. The role and positioning of the Spanish Armed Forces in NATO.
4. That status of the Canary Islands which are already within the
NATO geographic area. Questions concerning whether or not
foreign troops will be stationed there may arise.
5. The role of Portugal on the Iberian Peninsula and the politically
sensitive issue of control of Command Iberian Peninsula Atlantic
(COHIBERLANT). For Portugal, the prospect of Spanish entry into
NATO could be viewed with mixed emotions. The Portuguese firmly
favor the entry of their larger neighbor but also realize that they
will soon have to compete with Spain for NATO funds and plans.
During the summer of 1982, C0MI3ERLANT is scheduled to be under the
control of a Portuguese officer and Spain's entry to NATO could
complicate this command realignment proposal.
6. The role of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the
Moroccan Mediterranean coast is questionable since they do not
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fall within the geographic realm of NATO. The Spanish government
is committed to maintaining the security of these cities despite
persistent demands by the Moroccans for the return of the enclaves.
At the present time, there is no plan to expand the NATO treaty
area, so the Spanish government will have to defend its interests in
this area without Alliance assistance.
These issues will be part of the complex negotiating agenda, but
the advantages of NATO membership to Spain far outweigh the disadvantages.
Militarily, Spanish entry would allow for the updating of doctrinal
concepts, improvement of combat methods, reorganization of units, and
substantial renovation of the logistics system. The end results would
undoubtedly be improved military units with higher morale and a greater
degree of tactical and strategic efficiency. In addition, Spain's
accession could make three contributions to NATO: (a) the advantages of
her unique strategic position; (b) an increase in NATO forces; and (c)
the boost to NATO's morale and legitimacy through democratic Spain's
decision to work with its Western counterparts for the defense of freedom.
B. INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO THE SPANISH DEMOCRACY
Since the August 20, 1981 announcement by the Spanish Prime Minister,
Senor Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, that Spain would seek NATO membership,
cohesion within the governing UCD party has been eroding. A recent
article in the Economist stated that what "Spain really needs now is not
a Superman (as called for by some of the army generals who preferred life
94
under General Franco) but Superglue ." The governing UCD has lost
The Economist , 14-20 November 1981, "Spain," p. 57.
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most of its left wing and several fragments of its right wing. There
is now serious doubt as to whether the government can survive much
longer.
Party leaders have been meeting in order to try to stick, the party
together, but little progress has been made. Official statements by Sehor
Galvo Sotelo have adamantly confirmed his intention to remain in office
until 1983, when the next election is due, but many Madrid politicians are
speculating on the possibility of an election during the Spring of 1982.
If an election were to be held recent polls suggest the Socialist
95
Party (PSOE) would win.
The problems confronting the UCD are primarily internal; but the vocal
efforts of the PSOE and PCE in rallying popular support behind their
anti-NATO campaign during the fall of 1981 have affected the power base
of the UCD. The government party (UCD) presented a relatively weak front
to the Spanish people during this emotional debate over the NATO issue
and popular support has waned. There were other incidents of UCD mis-
management of Spanish affairs which worked in favor of the PSOE. During
early September 1981, for example, a tragic incident caused the death of
over 200 Spaniards and illness to thousands. A shipment of toxic olive
oil passed the normal inspection criteria of the government causing sick-
ness in many Spanish households. Investigative procedures were initiated
_o find out why this error was allowed; but these resulted in what many
called a government whitewash of the affair. The UCD has been so busy




of the primary goals of governing. The PSOE and PCE have benefitted by
mistakes such as these, which have served to underline what PSOE leader
Felipe Gonzales calls government incompetence.
The divisions and hesitations of the UCD government have had a double
effect:
1. Encouraging right-wing military officers to view Spanish politics
as a mess.
2. Increasing popular support for the Socialists.
In early November 1981, nine members of the lower house and six senators
from the social democratic group in the UCD walked out and set up their
own party. A former justice minister who has been a member of two
Centrist Cabinets, Sehor Fernandez Ordonez, was their leader. He is
founding a Democratic Action party and although he has promised to
cooperate with the government party, it is dubious how long the UCD
can effectively lead with a divided house. Senor Ordonez resigned from
the government in June 1981 after bitter inter-party disagreement on
fiscal reform and divorce. The new Democratic Action party is still
closer to the UCD than to the PSOE on NATO and international affairs.
But the growing success of the moderate element in the PSOE Party
evidenced at the October 1981 PSOE Congress could give rise to the
possibility of a future alliance between the new democratic party and the
moderates in the PSOE party, if events continue to be in constant turmoil
within the UCD.
Four right-wingers also defected from the UCD in November for disagree-
ment with the government over its policy on divorce. The Centre party's
conservatives have also been disturbed by the UCD's inability to do
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better in elections in Catholic rural Galicia and in other autonomy-
minded regions. Some of the UCD conservatives are beginning to lean
toward agreement with Sehor Fraga Iribame, the victor in Galicia and
well-known leader of the arch-conservative CD party, whose formula for a
stable Spain is a "grand right" coalition. He argues that a right
wing coalition is a national alliance which would please the army and
reconcile doubting officers to democracy. Middle-of-the-road UCD sup-
porters wonder pessimistically if even a "grand right" could satisfy the
disgruntled military, who have repeatedly called for a greater voice in
governing Spain.
Even the Communist Party (PCE) of Sehor Santiago Carrillo has been
besieged by internal dissension. Basque Communist militants are threaten-
ing secession from the party in order to shake off what they refer to as
Carrillo' s Madrid-based imperialism. Clear winners of these internal
political reshuf flings in Spain are the Felipe Gonzales-led PSOE members.
The problem with a PSOE victory in an election during the Spring of 1982
is that it could be the straw that breaks the camel's back—it could
serve to push the army over the edge. King Juan Carlos could face a
dilemma similar to that sprung upon his brother-in-law, King Constantine
of Greece, in 1967: whether to disown the coup-makers or go in with them
to try to have a restraining influence. Spain's king has stated that he
would deny legitimacy to any coup attempt, but what will happen in
Spain's near future still remains to be seen.
Turning to the international arena, there are definite steps which




1. NATO should welcome Spain with open arms. NATO military officers
could help to redirect the focus of the Spanish military officers
and provide them with a mission in an East-West context.
2. EEC countries should accelerate the pace of Spanish accession
negotiations. This solution would help to solidify Spain's democracy,
but prospects for quick, results from the EEC are limited, due to
factors explained previously.
3. Spain's European neighbors could coordinate a policy of international
cooperation aimed against militant Basque terrorists, who may give
right-wing elements, including those in Sapin's army, their best
pretext for a coup.
The government and the opposition in Spain have been sparring
nervously, watching the soldiers watching them. The calamity of a house
divided could beset Spain at the most crucial point in her quest for
European integration. Madrid leaders would do well to put aside their
internal party rivalries in order to accomplish their ultimate goals.
All of Europe (and the West) needs a democratic Spain.
C. NATO/EEC—THE GOALS ARE LINKED
Military security and economic development. The two are linked in
that one fosters the other and without both neither can be achieved.
Spain seeks the dual foreign policy goals of accession to NATO, the
Western security alliance, and the integration in the European Economic
Community. In pursuing these goals, the Spanish government seeks to
attain greater internal political stability and a more influential
position in Western Europe. This thesis has examined some of the
complex issues involved in Spanish integration into Europe. Consideration
111

of the European Economic Community as a whole and the various issues
pertaining to Spanish membership suggests that enlargement of the EEC has
created many new problems for member countries (e.g., the possibility of
added competition, the necessity of structural adjustments, additional
labor supply in an already depressed European labor market, and increased
political tensions between member states) and exacerbated old problems
(e.g., EEC budget inequities, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy,
and monetary deviations). The 1980s will be a crucial decade for the
European Economic Community. It faces a formidable array of interrelated
problems which stem from two fundamental causes: inherent weaknesses in
the EEC's institutional and financial structure (as examined in Sections
V, VII and VIII) and the Community's reluctance to adjust to changing
times, which has become particularly clear in the devate over Community
enlargement to include Spain. The prospects for maintaining and increasing
economic and political cooperation within the EEC will largely depend on
the Community member states ' willingness to address and rectify these
problems in the near future.
The most obvious structural defect is the Community's Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP), "an ever-growing bureaucratic monster which now
swallows three quarters of the annual EEC budget and is threatening the
96Community with iminent bankruptcy."
Section VIII of this thesis examined the reform of the CAP, che
pressures for change within the Community, and the additional problems






Other structural weaknesses in the EEC which were examined include the
budget and the laborious Community decision making process. The Community's
adjustment to Spanish membership will be difficult, but not impossible.
Spanish internal economic reform is necessary prior to EEC accession, as
explained in Sections VI and VII. Changes in economic, industrial,
agricultural and monetary policy should not be delayed by the Spanish
government. As pointed out throughout this thesis, Spain should immedi-
ately implement a coherent economic plan for EEC membership, since the
types of structural changes necessary will take years to accomplish and
could be initiated at the present time. To postpone critical issues
until after the entry offers no solution. Time should be used now for
the streamlining of Spanish administrative and institutional practices
using the EEC methods in monetary policy, taxation, banking, trade,
agricultural and industrial reform. The present interval, enforced by
the EEC problems of budget and CAP reform, offers the Spanish government
an opportunity which could be used constructively to alleviate future
economic problems.
The ramifications of Spain's application for NATO membership, given
Spain's strategic importance in the Mediterranean, are more obvious.
Militarily, Spanish entry would allow for the updating of doctrinal
concepts, improvement of combat methods, reorganization of units, and
substantial renovation of the Spanish logistics system. In addition,
Spain's accession to NATO will increase NATO forces by 340,000 troops and
boost NATO's morale and legitimacy through democratic Spain's decision to
work with its Western counterparts for the defense of freedom. (NATO
membership implications were discussed in Sections IX through XII.)
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It can be concluded that, as Spain attains greater integration
with Europe through membership in NATO and the EEC, the need for Spain to
depend on the United States for its national security will diminish.
Relations with the United States will continue to be important to Spain,
but the unique dependence which existed in 1953 will be gone. Spain has
been seeking a more independent role in world affairs through greater
association with Europe. Spain has begun to integrate into the European
Community. It may also be concluded that Spain's integrative process
points to a correlation between Spanish national security goals and
Spanish economic development. The two goals can be attained by Spanish
integration into NATO and the EEC. It is extremely important to Spain's
political, military, economic, and social development that the Western
nations accept Spain into their democratic club. As pointed out throughout
this thesis, numerous problems still confront the young Spanish democracy,
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